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INTRODUCTION
It has become a commonplace none the less accurate for that, to
1
say that Daubert v. Merrill Dow precipitated a revolution in the law of
2
expert evidence, the endpoint and exact contours of which are not
yet fully worked out. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly clear
that this revolution is changing the practical realities and results of
trial in many cases or classes of cases in which various sorts of
expertise play a central role. This is currently most obvious in regard
3
to toxic tort and products liability claims, but potentially the effects
of the revolution will almost certainly be felt in a much broader range
of cases, including all those criminal prosecutions in which claimed
expertise plays a substantial role in the outcome.
As the revolution unfolds, it raises serious issues along a number
4
of axes. All of these threads of controversy are interdependent, and
1

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
See, e.g., David L. Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and
Ruminations on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year 7 of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 662 (2000); Thomas R. Freeman, Guardians at the Gate, 24 L.A. LAW. 26, 28
(2001) (referring to the movement as “the Daubert revolution”); Marc S. Klein, The
Revolution in Practice and Procedure: Daubert Hearings, 1 SHEPPARD’S EXPERT & SCI.
EVID. Q. 655 (1994); Brian C. Murchison, Treating Physicians as Expert Witnesses in
Compensation Systems: The Public Health Connection, 90 KY. L.J. 891, 917 (2001-02)
(referring to the “the Daubert revolution”); Joseph Sanders, Shari S. Diamond & Neil
Vidmar, Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L.
139, 142 (2002) (same).
3
Daubert has led to a rise in summary judgments against plaintiffs in tort cases in
federal court resulting from exclusion of proffered expert evidence. See LLOYD
DIXON & BRANDON GILL, CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE
IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 56 (2001). Half of those summary judgments involved
exclusion of evidence regarding the cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. This is the
hallmark of the toxic tort case. In absolute numbers, the plurality of the cases were
classified as products liability cases. Id. at 21, tbl. 3.3. On the criminal side, with a
couple of notable exceptions, Daubert has had very little impact. See D. Michael
Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the
Dock, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 149 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Navigating Expert
Reliability].
4
These include: (1) the role of the judge versus the role of the jury in jury trials;
(2) the ideal of a uniform standard for establishing the preconditions of evidence
admissibility versus the impact of such low standards on the broader promises
represented by the case standard of proof as a whole; (3) the tenability of the claim
that judicial evaluation of evidentiary sufficiency adequately resolves questions of low
standards of admissibility when applied to claimed expertise; (4) judicial competency
to evaluate claims of expertise versus judicial deference to expert communities on
the validity of such claims; (5) the ideal of faith in juries to handle and evaluate
mixed information more satisfactorily than any other institutional arrangement for
dispute resolution versus profound suspicion that there are broad categories of
information (claimed expertise among them), that juries cannot be expected to
evaluate well; (6) loose standards for the scope of an expert’s claimed expertise
versus tight standards for scope of expertise; (7) concern that like cases be treated
2
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no satisfactory, full examination of the evolving law of expert
evidence can fail to touch on each of these issues. However, different
foci will yield different insights, and in this Article we focus on the
question of how a court is to go about the task of framing the issue to
which standards of reliability will be applied in the individual case.
This framing process directly implicates the issues of decisional
specificity and generality and their interconnection with the uses and
abuses of discretion and precedent.
As a preliminary matter, it is interesting to note that this
revolution was anything but inevitable. If one examines the record of
the federal district courts from the passage of the Federal Rules of
Evidence to the decision in Daubert, one sees at first more or less what
5
one would expect to see: for the first decade or so, opinions putter
along generally in the expected and usual way, with few reliability
6
7
challenges to proffered expertise worth the label. Then, around
alike versus normal notions of appellate deference to trial courts on rulings of
evidentiary admissibility; (8) concern that different cases be treated differently versus
a systemic interest of all judges in disposing of foundational issues regarding
expertise on broad grounds so as to be spared by precedent from having to
repeatedly consider the asserted reliability of various sub- and sub- sub-expertises in a
potentially very great number of cases.
5
This was accomplished by piggybacking on the research and research strategy
of the Rand study, DIXON & GILL, supra note 3. In order to generate pre-Daubert data
on how federal district courts handled challenges to expertise in civil cases, the Rand
researchers used a Westlaw search with a 27-term search string which was
overinclusive but unlikely to exclude any such challenge. Id. at 17. This string
generated 4097 hits from December 31, 1979 through June 1999. A random onethird (1345) of those cases were examined by “coders,” who were law students or
recent law graduates who had been trained to evaluate the opinions in regard to
whether they involved challenges to the admission of expert testimony on reliability
grounds in civil cases. Id. Their examination produced 399 cases which in their
judgment involved such challenges. Of those, 163 were decided before Daubert. Id.
at 20, tbl. 3.2. We contacted Dr. Dixon, and he graciously supplied us with a list of
those 163 cases. We then examined them ourselves. It turns out that we found that
we had some disagreement with the Rand raters as to the characterization of some of
the cases. At any rate, the assertions in the text are based on our re-examination of
that set of 163 cases, plus those turned up when we extended the search back to the
effective date of the Federal Rules of Evidence (January 1, 1975), a sample universe
large enough to yield confident insights.
6
The Rand search string turns up a total of about 70-75 cases a year of all types
until 1985, when the number jumps to 96, followed by 136 in 1986, and 154 in 1987,
with that trend continuing thereafter.
7
One of our major disagreements with the Rand raters concerns various
decisions which they treated as reliability decisions which we do not regard as such.
The largest such category involves persons proffered as experts who were called upon
to give what were essentially legal opinions. This was the largest single category in
the set of pre-Daubert cases (23 cases, or 14 percent of the total), resulting in 19
exclusions, or nearly a third of all exclusions. While courts are not always scrupulous
in guarding the line between legal conclusions and other kinds of statements, a fair
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mid-1985, things begin to take off, with serious issues of expert
reliability becoming hotter and hotter. However, these challenges,
with their attendant dispute and controversy, are largely
concentrated in one type of case dealing with one issue—the type of
case and issue involved in Daubert itself—that we may style “risk
9
increase” causation in toxic tort. Even before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Daubert case, lower courts had stripped the
“novel” requirement out of the Frye test in such cases, holding that
10
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 required general acceptance at least of
the methodology employed in the generation of all expert evidence
assertedly based on science when such evidence was proffered on the
11
issue of causation in toxic tort cases. In addition, many of the lower
court opinions contained language even more Daubert-like than this
12
regarding reliability in general.
When these issues (in particular the role of “general
acceptance”) were finally faced by the Supreme Court itself, it was not
at all obvious that the Court would go beyond fashioning a doctrine
proportion of courts have always rejected such testimony, and done so on the basis of
role, not reliability. We do not take these cases to deal with “reliability” in the Daubert
sense.
8
The number of cases hit by the Rand search string held between 32 and 43 for
every six-month period from 1980 until the second half of 1985, when it jumped to
53 and accelerated from there. It is almost as if Judge Weinstein’s opinion in In re
“Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
triggered the rise. See id. at 1275-76, 1285 (excluding expert testimony on the causal
link between various complaints of Vietnam veterans and their exposure to the
defoliant Agent Orange after a Daubert-like analysis, and granting summary judgment
for the defendants). However, the Agent Orange case was not the first Daubert
precursor. That award must go to Judge Becker’s opinion while a district court judge
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
which excluded various proffered expertise on reliability grounds and then granted
summary judgment. This decision was later reversed by the Third Circuit per Judge
Gibbons in In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir.
1983). The collision of viewpoints between Judge Becker and Judge Gibbons
prefigured many of the controversial Daubert issues to come.
9
See, e.g., Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. Tex. 1986)
(excluding treating physician on issue of causal link between plaintiff’s damages and
exposure to herbicide). There are 24 such cases, two-thirds of which resulted in
exclusion.
10
Hereinafter in the text Federal Rule of Evidence 702 will be referred to as
“FRE 702,” or simply “Rule 702.” We regard the abbreviation “Fed. R. Evid.” as
clumsy and as interrupting flow when used in text.
11
See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989)
(deciding on lack of general acceptance grounds without reference to novelty).
12
See Mendes-Silva v. United States, No. 89-1131 (RCL), 1991 WL 135090 (D.D.C.
July 12, 1991). In Mendes-Silva, one party’s experts claimed that vaccine-induced
encephalopathy had been caused by yellow fever vaccine. The court rejected the
proffered experts and provided a good summary of the tides of federal judicial
opinion on expert reliability as of the date of the opinion.
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that was limited to the recurring problems of that narrow band of
cases. Nor was it certain that the Court’s doctrine would go beyond
explicitly “scientific” evidence, a limitation which would have had the
imprimatur of tradition, and which would have covered all potential
proffers of expert testimony on the issue of risk increase induced by
exposure to a claimed toxic substance. However, as we all know, at
least by now, this the Court did not do. Instead, Justice Blackmun
fashioned an opinion which, although addressed mainly to a view of
the right way to judge reliability in the context of evidence claiming
the mantle of science, was firmly based on a construction of FRE 702
which was not so limited, but broader and trans-substantive, requiring
by its logic some threshold reliability determination for all proffered
13
expertise.
At first, litigants and lower courts were divided on whether the
Supreme Court had actually intended what it had apparently implied
14
15
in those passages of the opinion. Finally, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael
laid to rest all residual doubt about the breadth of the change in
approach being mandated, but left unclear many questions about
how the new enhanced gatekeeping approach was to operate in
differing contexts. In order to approach these questions with
appropriate caution, it is perhaps advisable to start from the bottom
up.
DANGERS AND DIFFICULTIES OF EXPERTISE IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM
THAT USES JURIES
Our legal notions about how to approach information for
purposes of doing justice and resolving disputes are inextricably
16
bound up with the institution of the jury, even in non-jury contexts.
13

The Court in Daubert said as much: “Rule 702 . . . clearly contemplates some
degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.”
509 U.S. at 589. But the Court then limits itself to a discussion of the nature of that
gatekeeping responsibility “in the scientific context because that is the nature of the
expertise offered here.” Id at 590 n.8. A functionally similar gatekeeping
responsibility for proffers of expertise not based on science would seem to follow,
and, in the event, did.
14
Compare, e.g., Iocobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
1994) (stating that Daubert validity analysis applies only to scientific evidence), with
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining that Daubert gatekeeping
and validity requirements apply to all expert testimony).
15
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
16
Professor Damaska sees the three institutional variables that condition the
characteristic details of Anglo-American proof law (the “pillars carrying common law
evidence”) as being the organization of the trial court (most notably the splitfunction jury system), the temporal concentration of proceedings (the “day in court”
model of the trial that starts and runs until it is finished), and party control (the
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By accident, or by some process that might be said to embody at least
some sort of design, our British forebears and ourselves evolved a
decisional system which displays some useful attributes of more
specifically purpose-built systems in other areas of endeavor. The
most important of these attributes for this Article (and perhaps
generally) is the creation of a two-stage split-function system in which
the first decision-maker (the judge) controls the information
available to the second decision maker (the jury), thus making
17
possible masking and bias filtration. The filtration is functionally
analogous to that which has become a norm of the scientific method
18
in the last half century. This system, in turn, makes it necessary to
determine by what standards a judge should perform this general
“gatekeeping” function in an adversary system.
A general consideration of this topic is of course beyond the
scope of this Article. However, it will serve present purposes to
observe that a number of competing interests come to bear on the
issue. The collision of these interests has resulted in two general
positions regarding proper standards of gatekeeping, positions which
are at odds with each other and are imperfectly reconciled in both
theory and practice. We might call these the “when in doubt, let it
19
in” principle and the “when in doubt, keep it out” principle. They
adversary system). See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 125 (1997). While
these are logically separable, in that one could, at least in theory, utilize a jury
without a separate judge, and one could certainly utilize a bias-filtering split function
without a jury, have a concentrated trial without a jury, and have a dominantly partycontrolled procedure without a jury, the existence of the jury would seem to make
the development of the other aspects more likely. This is true even though current
interpretations of the historical record place the development of strong adversary
control rather late in the game, in the late eighteenth century. See T.P. Gallanis, The
Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1999); Stephen Landsman, The Rise
of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 497 (1990); John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View
from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1197-1202 (1996).
17
See Allen D. Allen, Scientific Versus Judicial Factfinding in the United States, SMC-2
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS 548-50 (1972). Professor
Damaska makes the point that it is this split function that makes the notion of
“admissibility” even intelligible. Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76
MINN. L. REV. 425, 455-56 (1992).
18
See D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert
Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science:
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) [hereinafter
Risinger et al., Observer Effects].
19
One might say that this tension is best symbolized by Rule 403’s requirement
that probative value be “substantially” outweighed by prejudicial effect before
exclusion results on the one hand, and by Rule 104’s general position that the
burden is on the proponent of evidence to make out its admissibility. In Kumho Tire,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the general burden is on the proponent, but
indicated that the opponent has an obligation to point out why there is a reason to
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represent different resolutions of issues about the role of parties and
judges in an adversary system, the competence and trustworthiness of
juries, and the role of rationality in legal decision-making.
To put this in context, it is necessary to say a bit more about the
notion of an adversary system and the contrasting alternative, an
20
“inquisitorial” system.
An adversary system is one in which the
decisions about how contested disputes are to be presented to the
ultimate decision-maker are left in the hands of the disputing parties.
21
In an inquisitorial system (not a very apt label, but too embedded to
be changed here), these same decisions are all made by a decisionmaker who is at least formally neutral between the parties, and who
may or may not also be the ultimate decision-maker on the merits of
the dispute.
For all the rhetoric that is sometimes thrown up in defense of
22
“our adversary system,” no one argues in favor of a pure adversary
system for the simple reason that such a pure system, like direct
democracy, could not function except under exceedingly rare
conditions. This is because a pure adversary system would have no
judge, in the sense we are accustomed to. The parties would be free
to present whatever they themselves determined to be helpful to their
cause, and the party with the weakest case could filibuster
indefinitely, like a member of the Senate reading from a telephone
23
book, limited only by expense and endurance. For this reason at
doubt the proffer’s admissibility, to call its admissibility “sufficiently into question”
before the court is obliged to make any determination. 526 U.S. at 149, 152-53. This
further obscures the default position and heightens the tension between the two
approaches. Improper reversal of the burden of showing admissibility in the face of
serious challenge is one of the common tactics which courts have adopted to arrive at
“light-touch” treatment of prosecution-proffered expertise in criminal cases. See
Michael J. Saks, The Legal and Scientific Evaluation of Forensic Science, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1167 (2003).
20
By far the most sophisticated and influential writer in English on these issues,
both from a descriptive and a normative perspective, is Professor Damaska, starting
with Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973), and culminating in
DAMASKA, supra note 16.
21
See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 126-28 (2d ed. 1985); see
also Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414 (1952) (contrasting the rise of
the English adversary system with what Ladd took to be the “inquisitorial” function of
the jury at an earlier time).
22
As of February 2003, this cliché phrase generated 956 hits in the Westlaw
Journals database (JLR, as it is designated).
23
Wigmore claimed that something approaching this existed among some
African tribes. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A KALEIDOSCOPE OF JUSTICE 728 (1941). Even in
such a system, there would in most cases be a practical pressure not to try the
patience of the ultimate decisionmaker too much with proffers lacking any apparent
bearing on the dispute, lest this be held against you when decision time finally came.
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least, one would expect little disagreement that such a pure
adversarial system would be undesirable and that there must at least
be some judge-administered standards of relevance which will both
structure and limit the parties’ freedom to proffer material and
24
oblige the ultimate decision-maker to wade through it. In addition,
most would probably agree that this would apply even when the
parties themselves, for whatever their reasons, would be content to
reciprocally drown the decision-maker in mountains of information
of peripheral (or no) relevance to the issues that the applicable
substantive law defines as the material issues of the dispute. Although
it is sometimes said broadly that there is party autonomy to make the
rules of evidence for the individual case by agreement or failure to
25
object, there is at least a time-efficiency interest which belongs to the
dispute resolution system itself that vests the judge with authority to
cut off such proffers.
Beyond this minimum, the more pure adversaryists would begin
to dig in their heels. They would say that truth best emerges in the
clash of self-interested parties packaging whatever relevant
26
information is available in the most persuasive way they can, that
juries are (because they are not repeat players and are a group with a
range of life experiences to bring to bear in evaluating the meaning
of information) the best possible decision mechanism to handle all
types of relevant information, and that, essentially, the system would
work best if there were no rules of evidence beyond a weak relevance
27
check.
28
Adversary skeptics have a different view. While few, if any (at
24

“Courts are so organized that there must be some limit to the facts which may
be given in evidence, as there must be an end of litigation.” BURR W. JONES, THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES 3 (1896).
25
See DAMASKA, supra note 16, at 87.
26
This Article’s text has concentrated on aspects of adversary control of the
presentation of information, mainly because the Article is about judging the reliability
of proffers of expert testimony. One of the most powerful criticisms of an adversary
system, however, is that it leaves both the gathering and presentation of information
to partisan adversaries, and this may result in the non-presentation of important
information. This situation is exacerbated by limitations on information-sharing,
especially in the criminal context. See DAMASKA, supra note 16 at 98-101; see also ALVIN
I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 300-04 (1999).
27
For a description of this position, see Dale A. Nance, Reliability and Admissibility
of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191 (2003). As Professor Nance notes: “[T]he locus
classicus for this argument is Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON
AMERICAN LAW 34 (Harold J. Berman ed., 1961).” Id. at 195 n.13; see also GOLDMAN,
supra note 26, at 296.
28
For a careful examination of the arguments concerning the relation of
partisan adversary control to the truth-seeking function, see DAMASKA, supra note 16,
at 74-103, and GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 295-300. See also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON

2003

KUMHO TIRE AND EXPERT RELIABILITY

23

least in our legal culture), would advocate judicial gathering and
winnowing of dispute-relevant information and its presentation to the
ultimate decision-maker in edited and summary form with no input
from or consultation with the parties, adversary skeptics press two
kinds of arguments in favor of heavy judicial and rule-structured
control of what is given to the jury: adversary excess and jury
29
weakness in dealing with certain kinds of information.
The two
arguments dovetail. If juries can be persuaded to abandon reason or
overvalue certain information, advocates will not only not hesitate to
30
do it, they will arguably have an obligation to do it on behalf of their
31
clients. Upon reflection, there appear to be certain commonsense
classes of information that are subject to such abuse, such as hearsay
or “character” evidence. We must both authorize and require judges
32
to filter such information.
The formal rules of evidence give judges plenty of authority to
filter what the judge determines to be iatrogenic information and to
33
exclude it. However, the long tradition of the system, at least in the
last century, favors judicial restraint except in areas of mandated
34
categorical exclusion. What the Daubert and Kumho Tire decisions
TRIAL 82-87 (1949); MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980); Warren Berger,
Agenda for 2000 A.D.—A Need for Systematic Anticipation, Address at the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 79, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 83-96 (1976); Steven Landsman, Who Needs Evidence Rules,
Anyway?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 635 (1992); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the
Adversary System in a Post-Modern, Multi-Cultural World, 1 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL
ETHICS 49 (1996); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964);
Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 403 (1992).
29
DAMASKA, supra note 16, at 84.
30
It is adversary excess—“the old razzle dazzle,” in the terms of the recent
depiction of the trial system in the Academy Award winning motion picture
“Chicago”—that undermines many of the arguments which are sometimes made
concerning the desirability of “informational completeness,” and the claim that rules
of exclusion underestimate and disrespect juries. It is not what juries would do with
information in a vacuum, but rather what lawyers will do to juries using the
information, that justifies rules of exclusion.
31
See the obligation of zealous representation reflected in the ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1
(2003) (requiring the lawyer to act with “zeal in advocacy”).
32
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404, 801, 802.
33
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing leeway even in the face of the word
“substantially”). The term “iatrogenic” was originally a medical term meaning
“caused by the physician” and refers to a situation made worse by attempts to
improve it. By extension, it is a very useful word in regard to proof rules of various
kinds that on balance do more veritistic harm than good.
34
This is perhaps best represented symbolically by the requirement of Rule 403
that probative value be “substantially outweighed” by prejudicial effect before a judge
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did was to move expert evidence generally from the area of “light
touch control” and party autonomy to the area of heavier judicial
evaluation and control, in the name of “reliability.”
So what’s so wrong with unreliable expertise anyhow? The
commonsense fear is that factfinders will defer to the unreliable
expert and treat the unreliable expert’s testimony as reliable. One
could respond that this danger exists in regard to all evidence.
However, at least as to fact witness testimony, and various forms of
documentary, physical, or circumstantial proof, the assumption is
that average people have developed, through the process of living in
society, sufficient knowledge about the world of humans and its
workings that they have a fair chance to evaluate and accurately
weigh and discount information coming from such familiar sources.
Problems of misleading specialized social context are dealt with by
having a group of factfinders from across a range of social
backgrounds and experiences (that is, a jury), one or more of whom
it is hoped will be familiar with the specialized context from living in
it in their ordinary lives. Whatever the empirical realities of that
35
assumption, it becomes increasingly tenuous as the information
presented to the factfinder becomes more and more removed from
36
any socially common experience. And such claims of specialized
knowledge or skill beyond common experience are the essence of
37
asserted expertise.
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO EXPERT RELIABILITY
As previously noted, at least until what we might call the run-up
period immediately preceding Daubert, judges were not compelled by
doctrine and rarely undertook in practice to evaluate the asserted
warrant to believe claims of expertise directly, in the terms put forth
by the practitioners of the claimed expertise. In those days of “light
touch” evaluation, about all that was generally required was that the
proposed testimony be facially relevant, usually by virtue of some
conclusion (“opinion”) put forth by the putative expert, and that the
should exclude evidence proffered by a party, a signal not to indulge too fine an
exclusionary instinct to which most judges adhere even in fairly extreme
circumstances. See D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief and
“Legitimate Moral Force”—Keeping the Courtroom Safe for “Heartstrings and Gore,” 49
HASTINGS L.J. 403, 429-31 (1998).
35
It only helps in regard to the common experience of significantly large
communities in the venire pool, and even then there may be no representative of the
salient community on a given jury where one is needed.
36
See GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 308-09.
37
See D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of
Expertise, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 508, 510-11 (2000) [hereinafter Risinger, Taxonomy].
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claimed basis of the expertise not be affirmatively discredited as
38
invalid in some generally known and accepted way. In part because
of this low threshold of admissibility, even the concept of expertise
itself was ill-defined and under-examined in any kind of defensible
taxonomic detail. About the only subcategory of expertise which was
generally recognized was “scientific” expertise, and the demarcation
39
between “scientific” and other kinds of expertise was not at all clear.
40
As a result of the famous case Frye v. United States, scientific expertise
was further divided between “novel” scientific expertise and the rest,
with only “novel” expertise being subject to any special admissibility
consideration bearing on validity. Non-novel “scientific” expertise
was thrown back into the “light touch” pool along with all other
claims of expertise.
Even in regard to novel scientific evidence (however defined),
judges were generally not asked to evaluate the reliability of expert
claims in the claims’ own terms, but merely to determine if others in
41
an appropriate reference community (the “pertinent field” )
accepted them. Hence, judges were spared the necessity of learning
anything about criteria that might be applied to evaluate reliability
directly, instead merely trusting whatever reference community was
chosen to properly select and apply such criteria. And for everything
in the “light touch” pool (including “non-novel” “scientific”
expertise), facial relevance and minimum plausibility, backed by
commercial respectability, remained the only conditions of
42
admissibility.
This is not to say that there were not some judges who were
more aggressive than the average in attempting to filter out
unreliable expertise of whatever stripe. In so doing, they sometimes
used a tool which, though somewhat indirect, has important
analogues in, and implications for, current practice: definition of the
43
scope of a particular individual’s expertise.
Defining the
38

D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance
as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,”
137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 766-67 (1989) [hereinafter Risinger et al., Exorcism].
39
Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37, at 509.
40
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
41
Id. at 1014.
42
David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael J. Saks, Check Your Crystal Ball at the
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about
the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803-09 (1994). The authors
refer to this as the “commercial marketplace” test, but the respectability of the
market seems also to have been an important factor.
43
See, e.g., Globe Indem. Co. v. Highland Tank & Mfg. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1290
(E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that neither an electrical engineer nor an industrial
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appropriate scope of a given person’s claimed expertise raises
considerations which will become more generally important later in
this Article, to wit, the relative dangers of over-generality and overspecificity in framing such claims.
Consider an auto mechanic who has been trained by Ford Motor
Company to work on the engines in Taurus automobiles, and has
worked on such engines exclusively for the last five years, since he
completed his training. What can we say of the scope of his expertise
in regard to diagnosing an auto engine malfunction? We could begin
by saying that his only real expertise is limited to the workings of
engines he has actually examined physically in his work. However,
most of us would probably agree that this is so narrow as to be both
useless and unnecessarily grudging, even if his knowledge in regard
to those particular engines is marginally more reliable in theory than
that same knowledge extended to other engines we take to be
functionally similar, because they were manufactured on the same
assembly lines or according to the same specifications. But if we are
willing to grant him functionally equivalent reliability of knowledge
in regard to the similar but not-directly-experienced engines, we have
taken the first step in a journey with no clear endpoint. This journey
is in some contexts called “extension,” in others “generalization,” and
44
in yet others “external validity” and is related to the general
philosophical problem known as the problem of induction: how far is
one justified in generalizing from particular instances to other things,
either individually or represented by more general constructs such as
categories or the hierarchically interconnected categories and
45
concepts known as theories. To continue with our mechanic, we
would probably be willing to grant him knowledge sufficiently
reliable to be useful, and more reliable than that of the average
person, in regard to—what? All Ford engines, all automobile
hygienist was qualified to testify as an expert on the design of molasses storage tank
where neither witness had any prior experience or observational knowledge
regarding the proper design of a molasses storage tank under the factual setting
presented). Defining the scope of the expert’s expertise is essentially the approach
that Judge Becker, in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985),
recommended that Judge Wiener explore on remand. Judge Becker, perhaps as a
means of salvaging the conviction, recommended that the approach be applied to
the proffered “weaknesses of eyewitness identification” expertise that had been
wrongly excluded globally at trial. This case generated the label “fit” which was later
taken up by the Supreme Court in Daubert. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. It is possible,
however, that the “fit” rhetoric may be ultimately traceable to Wigmore. See infra
note 150.
44
WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, EXPERIMENTAL
AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 83-93 (2002).
45
See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE 201-10 (2001).
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engines, all gasoline-powered internal combustion reciprocating
engines, all engines of any kind, all mechanical principles at work in
Taurus engines? What factors are in play when we approach such a
problem?
First, it seems clear that the narrower we draw the circle around
the mechanic’s specific experience and training, the more reliable
the allowed exercise of expertise will be (assuming any reliability in
the first place). However, we can draw the circle so narrowly that
neither the allowed circle of this mechanic, or almost any other, will
contain the problem at issue in the case to be litigated. Drawing the
circle too narrowly will deprive the litigant of needed expertise, not
just from this expert, but potentially from the universe of available
experts. This would not be justified if the territory of the circle
drawn a bit wider would still represent acceptable reliability and
include the subject matter of the case at bar. However, drawing the
circle too broadly will give some litigants the right to present faux
expertise to which they are not entitled.
A large factor in deciding how broadly to draw the circle in the
legal context would seem to be the ease of obtaining more
appropriate and reliable expertise. If the case at bar involves the
workings of a Wankel rotary engine, a court might appropriately draw
the circle narrowly, insisting on the production of a mechanic
actually familiar with Wankel engines; however, if a plague had struck
the international convention of Wankel engine mechanics and wiped
them out, then it might be appropriate to draw the circle more
broadly.
These considerations are “best evidence” considerations, or
46
perhaps, more appropriately, “better evidence” considerations.
46

The distinction between “best evidence” requirements, and “better evidence”
considerations applied to various decisions on admissibility, emerges from the
interchange between Professor Imwinkelried and Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks,
and Sanders reflected in Edward J. Imwinkelried, Should the Courts Incorporate a Best
Evidence Rule into the Standard Determining the Admissibility of Scientific Testimony?:
Enough Is Enough, Even When It Is Not the Best, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19 (1999), and
David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks, & Joseph Sanders, How Good Is
Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645
(2000). In contrast with Professor Imwinkelried, Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and
Sanders propose a “better evidence” principle for evaluating the admissibility of
proffered expert testimony. It was Professor Nance who first pointed out (and
embraced) the extent to which the likely availability of better evidence affects
admissibility in today’s world. See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA
L. REV. 227 (1988). In Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), the Supreme
Court recognized a kind of “better evidence” principle when it declared that one
important consideration in determining exclusion of prejudicial evidence under
Rule 403 is the existence of equally probative but non-problematic evidence. Id. at
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Historically, the default position of most judicial practice (consistent
with the “light touch” approach and the reliance on jury evaluation)
seems to have been to draw the circle broadly as a matter of course
and only narrow it as the broad definition of scope became seriously
out of kilter in regard to exterior boundaries of specialization, and
perhaps not even then. For example, the nineteenth century mantra
that “any medical man is qualified to testify upon any issue of medical
practice” seems to still represent the formal position of many
47
jurisdictions, although the realities of the quality of knowledge
represented by boundaries between medical specialties ought to
compel a rethinking, and courts are generally spared consideration
of the “rule” by the good sense of parties in selecting experts.
Note that to this point we have been discussing situations where
an expert is disqualified because an issue is deemed to be outside the
scope of her expertise but where it is assumed that there are at least
some potential experts for whom the issue is within the scope of their
48
expertise.
Where Daubert general reliability issues and scope of
expertise dovetail most dramatically would be when a court appears
to rule that testimony is outside of the proffered expert’s area
because it is beyond the state of anyone’s art, at least anyone within
the expert’s asserted discipline.
The practical result of the dominant twentieth century practice
was that judges generally deferred to experts’ claims of expertise, or
in the case of “novel scientific” evidence, pursuant to the Frye test, to
the evaluations of those claims by other putative experts. As already
noted, this spared the judge from having to learn anything about the
epistemic underpinnings of an expert’s claim to expertise, issues that
are quite complicated and not entirely well worked out in any area of

651-52. Suffice it to say that, along with Professors Faigman, Kaye, Saks, and Sanders,
we believe that it is proper to take into account how much better a proffer could
have been, in determining whether it is good enough.
47
See generally Roy W. Fouts, The Medical Expert Witness, 19 NEB. L. BULL. 213
(1940). Such a position is perhaps less surprising when one considers that no
specialization had any institutional recognition within medicine until 1933. Id. at
219. McCormick stated in the 1954 first edition of his treatise that no membership in
a specialty was required as a condition of giving medical testimony, CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 14, at 29 (1954), a statement
that has survived through five editions until today, see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
13, at 24 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
48
See, e.g., Globe Indem. Co., 345 F. Supp. at 1291 (stating that while “[t]here are
people in the world who would qualify to give expert testimony on this question,” the
proffered engineer and toxicologist were insufficiently expert “regarding the proper
formulation of safety criteria to be followed in the design of molasses tanks in this
particular industrial setting”).
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49

claimed knowledge. It moved the task of such evaluation, if it was
going to be done at all, onto the plate of the jury, guided only by
such issues as might emerge from cross-examination, or by each
juror’s own evaluations of the reliability of the testimony (often
based, one must suppose, on the jurors’ surface impression of the
apparent authoritativeness of the witness and the apparent
plausibility of any supporting explanations to which she might
testify). Given the difficulty of distinguishing apparent plausibility
from validity, it is no wonder that the dominant account of the jurors’
usual practical role in resolving issues that have been the subject of
expert testimony is either deferential acceptance when only one
expert testifies, or selection between the experts as attractive persons
and apparently authoritative figures when two experts oppose each
50
other.
Another beneficial side effect of the “light touch” regime, from
the judge’s perspective, was that even when a Frye-type determination
had to be made, it was generally thought appropriate to make it in
the broadest terms possible, or (which is the same thing) treat any
determination of a previous judge as resolving the issue in the
broadest terms possible. This is well illustrated by the way in which
bitemark identification became generally accepted as a proper
subject for testimony in American courts. In the first case to consider
51
the issue, the 1975 California case of People v. Marx, the California
court of appeals faced a very rare factual circumstance involving both
an unusually clear bitemark and an unusually rare pattern of
dentition. What that court in fact did was fashion a narrow exception
to the California version of the Frye test, allowing admission of the
evidence in the specific instance in front of it while saying
simultaneously: “Concededly, there is no established science of
52
identifying persons from bitemarks.” However, as one of us has
53
written before:
[T]hereafter the Marx case was regularly cited by courts dealing
with much more questionable applications of bite mark
49

See Faigman et al., supra note 46, at 655-56.
Or, to be broader and more kind, the resort to “peripheral processing”
heuristics which may include these factors. For a summary of the available empirical
research in regard to jury processing of expert testimony in complex cases, see
Joseph Sanders, The Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert
Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881 (2003).
51
126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Ct. App. 1975).
52
Id. at 353.
53
Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 3, at 138. Notes 54-56 are
retained from the original work but renumbered sequentially with those of this
Article.
50
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identification, without noting Marx’s particular facts.
In the
normal way that courts have worked in defining the parameters of
admissibility for proffered expertise, Marx came to be read as a
global warrant to admit bite mark identification evidence
whenever a person displaying apparent credentials chose to testify
to an identification. Perhaps the most notorious such case was
the very next full-scale examination of bite mark evidence, the
55
Illinois case People v. Milone, which, relying at least in part on
Marx, declared bite mark evidence acceptably reliable under
56
much less clear conditions.
After Marx and Milone there was
little serious consideration given to bite mark foundational
dependability by subsequent courts . . . .

Such an approach yielded a judicially attractive result: a broad
admissibility warrant resulting in effortless and time-efficient
decisions on admissibility by invocation of precedent without any
requirement of thought. The fact that the broad warrant might
authorize the admission of much that was very unreliable did not
appear to cross the judicial mind. In any individual case where a
particular judge might be troubled by questions of reliability, there
might be other tools that could be used to achieve an individually
satisfactory result (such as manipulation of the scope of expertise
applied in the particular case). Or the court might salve its
conscience by contemplating the supposed universal solvent of crossexamination (rarely an effective solution in such cases, but what the
57
heck). However, explicit and systematic consideration of reliability
54

See, e.g., People v. Sloane, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 69 (Ct. App. 1978) (relying on
Marx to establish the general reliability of bitemark evidence).
55
356 N.E.2d 1350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
Notwithstanding the admitted
controversy concerning the reliability of bitemark identification among forensic
odontologists both at the trial and in the literature of the time, the Milone court
found the Frye general acceptance standard had been met, citing Marx. Id. at 135960. Milone remains controversial. The defendant has been released, but continues to
maintain his innocence and attack the bitemark evidence. See Milone v. Camp, 22
F.3d 693, 697 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that Milone was released after serving
almost twenty years of his 90- to 175-year prison sentence). In addition, there is good
evidence that another person actually committed the murder, a person whose
bitemarks have been judged by at least one forensic odontologist to be as good a
match for those on the victim as Milone’s. See id. at 700-01 (noting that the
bitemarks found on the victim match the dentition of known serial killer Richard
Macek and that Macek confessed to the murder several times prior to his 1987
suicide).
56
See Milone, 356 N.E.2d at 1355-56, 1360 (upholding the trial court’s decision to
allow bitemark identification testimony even though four forensic odontologists
testified to the unreliability of such positive identification).
57
Compare the faith in cross examination of experts manifested in Daubert, 509
U.S. at 593, with James M. Shellow, The Limits of Cross Examination, 34 SETON HALL L.
REV 317 (2003).
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generally was not a fundamental part of the job of judging.
Daubert and its progeny have changed all that, and not just for
the federal courts. Evidence is accumulating that Daubert has
changed the standards applied to expert reliability not only in states
explicitly adopting its approach, but also in many states explicitly
58
claiming to eschew it. Exactly how things have changed is less clear,
however.
KUMHO TIRE AND THE NEW REGIME OF EXPERT RELIABILITY
GATEKEEPING
59

In many ways, Kumho Tire is the most important of the Daubert
trilogy, not only for making clear the Rule 702 gatekeeping
60
obligation in regard to non-science “experience-based” expertise
(the point for which it is best known), but perhaps more importantly
for what it says about the general construction and proper approach
to the requirements of Rule 702 even in regard to the products of
science. Whether one is examining scientific expertise or not, three
points come though clearly from Kumho Tire: First, a court must
review the reliability of the proffered expertise specifically as it
applies to the task for which it is being utilized in the litigation in
61
which it is offered, not in some more global sense. Second, a court
is obliged to think about and select the most appropriate criteria of
reliability for the kind of expertise being proffered, given the
62
circumstances of its generation in the particular case. The authority
to honestly make that inquiry (and, to our minds, only that authority)
is the essence of the “flexibility” and “discretion” referred to in the
63
Kumho Tire opinion. Third, in regard to all expertise (even that
58

See States Move to Daubert, Even When They Say They’re Stuck on Frye, 2 EXPERT
EVID. REP. 161 (2002).
59
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
60
“We conclude that Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial judge’s
general gatekeeping obligation—applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific
knowledge,’ but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’
knowledge.” Id. at 141
61
This position is explained at length with extensive quotations from the Kumho
Tire opinion in D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic
Science after Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV 767, 773-75 (2000)
[hereinafter Risinger, Task at Hand]. See also Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic
Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer
at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1049-60 (2001).
62
See Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 774.
63
“The objective . . . is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert
testimony.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152. The Court stated that while the relevant
reliability inquiry “should be ‘flexible,’” the “‘overarching subject [should be] . . .
validity’ and reliability.” Id. at 158 (quoting with approval the opinion of the district
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based on claims of scientific authority), while a court may consider
64
the famous (or infamous) “Daubert factors,” the presence or absence
of one or more is not necessarily dispositive of sufficient reliability to
65
gain admission. What is important is the honest exposition by the
court of an appropriately strong reason to believe that the proposed
product of expertise was generated by a process that will generally
yield a result sufficiently reliable so that the official ends of the proof
66
system, will not be undermined by admission of evidence of that
level of reliability on that kind of issue in that kind of case.
We say that Kumho Tire “says” the above things, but the saying is
more explicit as to some things than others. As to the first, we believe
that there can be no serious doubt that narrow (rather than global)
court). The Court further indicated that the inquiry should be directed toward some
“set of reasonable reliability criteria.” Id.
64
Referring to “four” factors has become standard, though the real number of
factors is subject to debate. The Daubert opinion spake thus, without numbering
factors: “a key question [in regard to a theory or technique] . . . will be whether it can
be (and has been) tested.” 509 U.S. 579, 593. “Another pertinent consideration is
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication.
Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of
admissibility . . . .” Id. “Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique,
the court should consider the known or potential rate of error . . . and the existence
and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation.” Id. at 594.
“Finally, ‘general acceptance’ can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.” Id. These were
summarized in Kumho Tire as “several factors” without numbering, but with four
bullet points. 526 U.S. at 149-50. However, it is easy to separate whether a claim
“can be tested” (its empirical nature or theoretical falsifiability) and the degree to
which it has been subjected to actual testing, into two separable but nested factors.
In addition, the potential rate of error is arguably always 100 percent in the absence
of some kind of testing (though not necessarily the kind of formal testing that would
lead to more specific and quantifiable knowledge of an error rate). Knowledge of
error rates is thus a product of testing. In addition, can “standards of control” for a
technique’s operation be a relevant factor if there is no reason to believe such
“standards” enhance reliability? This too would seem to be a question of testing, at
least in some contexts. Finally, a fortiori “general acceptance” is the product of peer
review, so one can argue that there are really eight explicitly referenced “Daubert
factors” (falsifiability, testing, peer review, publication, potential error rate, known
error rate, standards of practice, general acceptance) or only three (falsifiablility,
testing which reveals error rate, peer review). In addition, the Daubert Court invokes
the relevance-based concept of fit, 509 U.S. at 591, which is perhaps best seen as an
analogue to “external validity,” and which can easily be asserted as a fifth (or ninth,
or fourth) “Daubert factor.” See supra note 43 and infra note 70. Courts have not
always referred to four Daubert factors, either. See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324
F.3d 261, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2003) (five factors); United States v. Prime, 220 F. Supp.
2d 1203, 1204 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (five factors); United States v. Griffin, 50 M.J. 278,
284 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (six factors).
65
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
66
That is, the policies identified as the ends of the system in FED. R. EVID. 102
(truth determination and justice, in the sense of proper application of law to
accurately determined facts).
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reliability is the explicit theme that drives the entire opinion. The
second—the thoughtful selection and application of criteria—is also
fairly explicit, given that the court makes it clear that such flexibility
and “latitude” as it refers to is to be utilized in the service of
68
determining and utilizing “reasonable measures of reliability.”
The third principle requires a bit more exposition, but seems to
us a product of fairly necessary implication. The court emphasizes
that the “four factors” may be considered in determining the
reliability warrant of non-scientific expertise when it would be
reasonable to do so given the nature of the expertise under
69
examination. The court further emphasizes (by way of reiterating a
part of Daubert often unfortunately ignored) that the four factors
were not each necessary conditions for a proper reliability warrant,
70
nor were other factors foreclosed.
Thus, on our interpretation of Daubert and Kumho Tire, the
formulation of the reliability issue in regard to proffered expert
testimony in every case must take the form, explicitly or implicitly, of
the following four-part question, which might be said to embody a
different, more general, and perhaps more generally helpful, fourfactor approach than the one that has too often been mechanically
derived from Daubert. These may be best captured initially when set
out in the form of a question, thus:
In regard to any proffer of expertise, is there good reason to
believe that the proffered product of the claimed expertise (given
its specific form and the methods and conditions of which it is a
product) provides the jury with appropriately reliable information
on the case-specific question upon which the expert is proffered?

Each of the four parts of this question must be given contentspecific consideration with regard to the individual case, but it is the
67

See Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 774-76.
See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 153. One should note that the Court in Daubert also
observed that though the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 was a flexible one, its
“overarching subject is the scientific validity – and thus the evidentiary relevance and
reliability – of the principles that underly a proposed submission.” 509 U.S. at 59495.
69
Id. at 150.
70
Id. at 151. This is important to keep in mind when one realizes that none of
the “four factors” addresses very specifically the criteria by which science itself would
evaluate the belief warrant for the reliability of scientific data and its implications in
regard to a question different from the narrow question addressed in the experiment
or study which generated the data—questions generally referred to by the labels
“internal validity” and “external validity.” See infra notes 79-80. The four factors have
too often been deadweights woodenly applied, inert impediments to the
development of a sophisticated approach by the courts to belief warrants for
scientific evidence.
68
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proper framing of the second and fourth parts of the question which
give initial structure to the court’s gatekeeping task, and contextually
guide the answers to the particular issues raised by the first and third
parts of the question. In the proper performance of this judicial
function, one must start with the second and fourth inquiries, and it
is often most helpful to start with the fourth. For this reason we will
number and label the various parts of the complex question set out
above as follows:
1. Framing the case-specific target issue.
2. Framing the case-specific claim of expertise.
3. Determining what available information bears on a rational
belief warrant in regard to the reliability of the specifically
claimed expertise.
4. Determining the proper case-specific legal standard of certainty
for such a belief warrant.

How these inquiries should be conducted in particular cases can
perhaps be best illustrated by starting with a toxic tort hypothetical,
somewhat simplified, but not too removed from the real world.
IDENTIFYING THE TASK-SPECIFIC RELIABILITY QUESTION FOR EXPLICIT
PRODUCTS OF SCIENCE
Assume that a plaintiff is claiming that her deformed foot was
caused by exposure to a compound, legally prescribed to and
ingested as a drug by her mother during pregnancy, which goes
71
under the trade name Benediction. In order to establish the legally
required element of causation, she intends to call (perhaps alone,
perhaps among other intended experts) a toxicologist who will base
his testimony on the role of in utero exposure to Benediction in
causing abnormalities of the feet in humans on animal studies
involving the administration of Benediction to lab rats.
1.

Framing the case-specific target issue

Somewhat ironically, the problem of defining the appropriate
scope of the case-specific reliability issue is least in that troublesome
area that precipitated the Daubert revolution, “increased risk”
causation in toxic tort. In each case, the target issue is more or less
self-defining. No judge would be tempted to define the issue in the
71

The play on the name of the controversial real-world compound Bendectin is
obvious, but the reader should not lose sight of the fact that Benediction is a
fictitious compound used only to illustrate the process of framing the reliability
question.
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Benediction birth defect case as, “Is there good reason to believe that
the proffered product of claimed expertise provides appropriately
reliable information on whether an ingested chemical can cause birth
defects?” This part of the target “task at hand” question automatically
coalesces around the particular chemical or biological agent attacked
as a causal agent by the plaintiff. Nor is it likely that the issue ought
to be drawn in regard to a particular subclass of Benediction, given
the general fungibility of effect for chemical compounds of the same
formula. While there might perhaps be inference issues concerning,
for example, what to make of data on causation from compounds
closely related to Benediction chemically, those are external validity
questions that go to the belief warrant for the relevancy of the
proffered evidence, not to a primary part of the target issue itself.
Similarly, the real question under investigation in such a case
cannot be “Did Benediction cause this particular plaintiff’s birth
72
defect?” (in anything but a purely formal or notional sense ),
because such a question is unanswerable, at least in the ways we find
most satisfying when dealing with causation in everyday
commonsense terms (causation thought of by a sort of “mechanical
linkage” metaphor which is most comfortably understood in
73
situations of physical trauma ). This is for two reasons: first, because
it is exceedingly rare that every exposure to such a claimed causal
agent is followed by the asserted effect, and second, because such
birth defects have a background rate of natural occurrence, and, at
least in the current state of knowledge, there is no means of knowing
whether the plaintiff’s defect was one of the ones which was going to
occur anyway even absent exposure to Benediction. In other words,
such cases cannot yield satisfying answers to questions of “but-for”
74
causation. At least in the present state of our knowledge, they often
manifest what appears to be significant randomness in any causal
linkage that exists, and this element of the random might conceivably
72

That notional sense is still embodied in the black letter of the law. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES) §
28(a) (Tentative Draft No. 3 Apr. 7, 2003) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT, T.D. 3].
73
Such a mechanical linkage model works fine for many everyday interactions,
but can easily become what Shadish, Cook & Campbell refer to as “a billiard ball
model that requires commitment to deterministic causation or that excludes
reciprocal causation,” observing that such a model is “a caricature of descriptive
causation that has not been used in philosophy or in science for many years . . . .”
SHADISH ET AL., supra note 44, at 465.
74
And therefore, in such cases, issues of general and specific causation collapse
into one another in the individual case, in that, at least once individual exposure has
been established, both are to be inferred simultaneously from exactly the same
evidence (data).
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be found to be part of the linkage phenomenon even if we had
perfect knowledge.
So our real expert inquiry must be something like, “How much
did Benediction exposure raise the probability of the plaintiff being
born with her birth defect?” However, this is still underspecified.
Virtually all such claimed relationships, when they are shown to exist,
exhibit substantial “dose effects,” that is, variations in induced risk
75
depending on the amount of exposure or dose level. Because this is
true, we should take it into account in framing the “task at hand”
target issue, which thus becomes, “Given the level of exposure of the
plaintiff to Benediction as shown by the other evidence, how much
does that exposure raise the probability of birth defects?” But this
also remains potentially underspecified, since many teratogens raise
the risk for some classes of birth defects a lot and other classes of
defects almost not at all. So the final iteration of the empirical
question becomes, “Given the plaintiff’s exposure level as shown by
the other evidence, how much does such exposure raise the risk of
birth defects of the kind exhibited by plaintiff?”
There are still hard issues left, of course. The first one is a legal
issue: What rise in risk (increased probability of birth defects) is
enough to fasten liability onto the defendant? This is a “question of
law” (or of legal policy) of the normal type. The most popular
76
answer currently is a doubling of risk, because given a large number
of cases, at least half the people paid in such cases are paid by those
77
who should pay.
A lower required risk increase results in the
75

See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henefin, Reference Guide on Toxicology, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 406-09 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
REFERENCE MANUAL]. Even in the so-called “no threshold model,” not every exposure
actually causes an effect. Id. at 407. The model merely posits that any exposure might
cause an effect. Note that dose is a function both of intensity and duration of
exposure. RESTATEMENT, T.D. 3, supra note 72, § 28 reporter’s note, at 163-64 (citing
authorities). Note further that the handiest short summary of current issues in
causation in the toxic tort settings is to be found in this reporters note.
76
RESTATEMENT, T.D. 3, supra note 72, § 28 reporter’s note, at 180-82 (citing
authorities).
77
This is at least true in regard to “physical deformity” birth defects such as the
one in the hypothetical, which by definition have a pre-birth onset. As to other
conditions, such as cancer caused by a teratogen, some percentage of the group
(which particular individuals are unknown) would have gotten the cancer anyway,
and thus they have had their cancer accelerated (maybe a lot, maybe a little) instead
of being individuals who got cancer and otherwise would have been free of such
cancer throughout their lives.
See Sander Greenland & James M. Robins,
Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 321 (2000).
Whether and exactly how the possibility of “mere” acceleration should affect the
legally required standard of sufficient risk increase, or whether it should be viewed as
a remedies issue, is unclear.
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majority of people who are paid out of defendants’ pockets being the
people who would have gotten the condition without the defendants’
input, and to that degree gives that set of plaintiffs (whose individual
members cannot be identified) a windfall. This makes defendants
become insurers for damages they did not cause. A higher required
risk increase results in injured parties not recovering who ought to be
paid by defendant, which raises both justice and efficiency problems.
These are persuasive arguments to many on what the standard of the
law ought to be, but there are other arguments which can be made in
favor of both higher and lower risk increases as standards of legal
78
responsibility. The point here is not which legal standard is best,
but merely that this decision has nothing to do directly with control
of the reliability of expertise, or the kind of information which
experts can justifiably provide.
A related legal issue concerns the question of how sure the
factfinder must be concerning the legally designated risk increase in
order to reach a verdict, but that is again a legal issue of applicable
standard of proof. Difficult as such issues may be, they remain
questions of law for the judge (or the legislature) outside the domain
of any expert. It will be necessary, however, for the judge to be clear
on the applicable legal requirements at the point of framing the
reliability question, because that legal requirement forms a part of
the question to be answered by reference to the proffered expertise.
Thus, the final form of the target issue becomes, “Given the plaintiff’s
exposure level, did that exposure raise plaintiff’s risk of developing
the deformity she now has by at least a factor of two (or ‘a significant
amount’ or ‘by a factor of ten’ or ‘to a reasonable certainty,’ that is,
whatever the applicable legal standard may be that will be treated as
establishing causation)?”
2.

Framing the case-specific claim of expertise

Having framed the empirical target of the proposed expertise,
the court will then face the problem of expressing in exact form the
expert claims that are said to bear on the target issue. In risk-increase
toxic tort cases, this will almost certainly be information of varying
78

A lower required risk increase might promote care and safety, a higher
required risk increase might encourage the development of more specific evidence
concerning sub-populations to separate out the sub-populations in the large-set data
that can be identified as having different relative risks. Specifically, this would
encourage efforts to tailor research to narrower populations, thus reducing the
possibility of “substructuring” (the uneven distribution of risk within a sampled
population), and yielding more confidence in the applicability of the risk numbers
to the individual case.
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quality from a fairly limited number of domains of inquiry, such as
epidemiology, experimentation on animals, information on the
effects of compounds claimed to be related to the compound in the
case, etc. All of these proffers will have a significant claim to being
“scientific evidence,” that is, the products of some part of normal
science practice. Indeed, given the nature of the target inquiry in
such a case, it would seem extremely unlikely that any evidence would
be proffered that was not claimed to be scientific in this sense.
One characteristic of any testimony that might arguably be
deemed the product of science is that it will be traceable back to data.
In addition, in most parts of science (and certainly all those that
might provide reliable information on risk increase in toxic tort), the
testimony will be traceable back to formal data. By formal data we
mean the products of some organized regime of observation where
both the observation protocols and the results are explicit and
objectively recorded in some way, and therefore both potentially
available and replicable. The information in the proposed expert’s
testimony may reflect data only at second hand, or in summary, or in
some sort of combination conceptually. It may reflect extension,
induction, and abduction away from the data. But to the extent that,
upon examination, it cannot be traced back to formal data in some
way, it cannot presume to wear the mantle of science.
The first necessary step, therefore, is to describe, at least in
general, the kind of data upon which the proposed expert’s
testimony is based. In our hypothetical, we have said that the
proffered expert proposes to testify about the results of (data
generated by) studies of Benediction administered to pregnant
laboratory rats, the observed rates of deformity of the extremities with
and without such exposure in resulting offspring, and also the
implications of those studies for forming a judgment about the likely
risk increase, if any, in humans exposed to Benediction, as well as the
magnitude of such increase. This kind of testimony may immediately
be seen to have two significantly different aspects: one dealing with
the validity and meaning of the study data in their own terms (i.e.,
Were the studies undertaken by procedures that allow us to say
reliably what the data mean concerning effects or associations in the
groups of animals tested?), and the other dealing with reasoning
from the data to groups other than the one tested (i.e., Would the
data distributions hold for other animals of the same species, other
animals of different closely related species, other animals not so
closely related, higher or lower dosages as a ratio of body weight, in
each of these groups, etc.?).
The first of these aspects of science-based testimony raises
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questions about what is called “internal validity”—essentially, “Are the
data any good in their own apparent terms, given the way they were
79
generated?” The second of these aspects raises issues of “external
80
validity,” —that is, “How far are we justified in taking the data,
assuming them to be accurate in their own terms, and in drawing
implications or conclusions in other contexts either very closely
related (other members of the same sex and age of the same species)
or much further away (say, humans)?” If you hear an echo of the
problem of “area of expertise” and the Ford Taurus mechanic, you
would not be wrong.
As to internal validity, it is accomplished by adhering to
procedures designed in advance to eliminate, to the extent possible,
81
potential confounding factors. Science in general has a few general
norms of such good practice, and each particularized special area of
inquiry supplements the general norms with others purpose-built to
reduce or eliminate the particular threats to internal validity that
reflection has suggested as the most dangerous in that particular
82
Internal validity depends on good study design and
domain.
execution.
The essence of external validity is not so easy to suggest. No one

79

This is close enough for our purposes without getting too deeply into the
technical controversies that have surrounded the notion in the land of its birth. The
concept was formulated by the late eminent psychologist Donald Campbell in the
1950’s in the context of cause-and-effect studies, and in that tradition is generally
limited to such studies. SHADISH et al., supra note 44, at 37. It was originally
contrasted with “external validity” in much the same terms as are used in the text,
that is, external validity referred to extension of conclusions to contexts outside the
narrow bounds of the actual study. Id. In later refinements, the Campbellian
taxonomy of validity for causal studies expanded to include two more validity
components, “statistical conclusion validity” and “construct validity.” Statistical
conclusion validity refers to the validity of statistical conclusions derived from data in
individual studies. Id. Construct validity refers to the validity of constructs suggested
by an individual study or studies. A strong argument can be made that statistical
conclusion validity can best be viewed as an aspect of internal validity and that
construct validity is best viewed as an aspect of external validity. However, Campbell
and his school view them as independent. Id. It is unnecessary for present purposes
to explore this more fully. Also, for present purposes, it makes sense to apply both
external and internal validity notions to skills testing contexts as well as cause-andeffect contexts. (There is an argument by which one can equate or convert skills
tests to cause-and-effect tests, but it is beyond the scope of this footnote and this
Article.)
80
Id.
81
Id. at 39-42.
82
For instance, in any inquiry using humans as apprehenders or interpreters,
one such principle is “keep the process of data collection and analysis as blind as
possible for as long as possible.” Robert Rosenthal, How Often Are Numbers Wrong?, 33
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1005, 1007 (1978).
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believes that internally valid results of studies have meaning only for
the exact entities in the exact universe studied. Everyone is easily
convinced that they may be generalized to other universes not
studied, as long as they are populated by entities exactly like the ones
in the studied universe. One of the bases for the scientific success of
physics and chemistry is their good fortune at their foundations to be
dealing with universes of entities that are virtually completely alike,
and therefore fungible when it comes to generalizing from data (you
seen one gamma ray or atom of a hydrogen isotope, you seen ’em all,
83
pretty much literally for most purposes ).
When one moves into biological systems, however, such
fungibility starts to break down, but in what patterns and for what
purposes, it is not usually clear. This raises difficult questions about
principles of external validity for study results, such as: “When are
results in mice going to track results in humans?” Note that the
answer is not likely to be universal. Few would instinctively say
“always.” One might be tempted to say “never,” but the effects of a
hydrogen bomb on a mouse at ground zero is likely to correspond to
the effects on a human pretty completely. Ultimately, it is an
empirical question subject to investigation, but ironically it is a
question that can only be answered completely by doing studies that
render the question moot for most purposes, since you have to
establish the effects on humans by direct empirical study in order to
be sure of the correspondence, and then you do not need to reason
from the animal model for that effect. In some animals, however,
there can be enough experience for suggestive patterns to develop
which indicate the tenability and strength of reasoning by extension
84
in regard to at least some classes of phenomena in humans.
On some questions, some kinds of studies have a validity
advantage because they come close to dealing with the question
under investigation without the necessity of too much extension.
This is why epidemiology has been viewed as epistemically privileged
on issues of risk increase in toxic tort. A well-designed epidemiology
study of the very agent in question at the same exposure levels as are
involved in the case at bar comes close to answering the risk-increase
question directly.
The key term here is “well-designed.”
Epidemiological studies are at least as difficult to design in internally
85
valid ways as other kinds of studies and may suffer from potential
83

Except for the loose use of the term “see.”
Goldstein & Henefin, supra note 75, at 410-11.
85
Michael D. Green, D. Michael Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on
Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 354-73.
84
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confounds involving sampling bias, improper control designs, and
low statistical power resulting from inappropriately small sample sizes
88
for the potential effect size being studied, among others. The
results of bad epidemiology with poor indices of internal validity have
no claim to any privileged position just because its bad data would be
more directly meaningful to the question under investigation if it
were good. (This illustrates that internal and external validity are not
theoretically independent, but rather they are nested. Internal
validity can exist in theory without external validity, but there can be
no external validity without internal validity.)
Good epidemiology is difficult to design and very expensive. In
many toxic tort claims, good epidemiology is just not available. It is
one thing to say that good epidemiology trumps other sources of
information when available. It is another to say that questionable
epidemiology should lock out other relevant information from other
domains of inquiry, and yet another to say, as some courts have, that
only epidemiology can form the basis of sufficient and sufficiently
reliable information to take a risk-increase causation issue to the
89
jury.
This is not to deny that the presence of internal and external
validity problems can so undermine the reliability of proffered
testimony claiming to be the product of science that it is not
sufficiently reliable to deserve entry to the courtroom at all. This
would be especially true where there was a consensus in the generally
relevant scientific communities that the data were unreliable or the
extensions unjustified even for provisional belief, or that more
apposite evidence rendered the proffered conclusions highly
unlikely. It seems prudent, not only to find that such substantial
outliers provide insufficient evidence even to support a
90
preponderance verdict alone, but also to exclude them in order to
86

Id. at 355-56.
Id. at 363-64.
88
Id. at 362.
89
Such a so-called “epidemiologcal threshold” was first employed in Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d. 307, 315 (5th Cir. 1989) (construing Texas law).
Most courts properly reject it. See, for example, the extensive authorities collected
in RESTATEMENT, T.D. 3, supra note 72, § 28 reporter’s note, at 170-71.
90
As Christopher Mueller points out, there is nothing wrong with granting
summary judgment after a “Daubert hearing” because the proffered expert testimony
is so unreliable that it would not be reasonable for a jury to base a verdict on it.
Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should
Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 987 (2003). Perhaps courts in
such cases would be better advised if they simply said this instead of declaring such
evidence “inadmissible” under Rule 702, then granting summary judgment for
having no evidence. Courts should avoid making admissibility determinations or
87
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insulate the jury from potential reliance on them even when there is
other evidence, and this seems to be what was envisioned in Daubert
and Kumho Tire.
However, some residue of questions in both spheres of validity
will be present in the most reliable scientific evidence. Studies are
rarely perfect, or perfectly on target, and the fact that available
studies are not perfect or require some extension to apply to the
target causation issue should not automatically result in exclusion of
testimony based on them, no matter how forcefully their
imperfections are pointed out.
It is not uncommon for causal relationships to be inferred by the
convergence of information from various domains at some remove
from the target issue, where the product of no single domain could
be said to be a reliable indicator of causation by itself. This is not
surprising. It is the normal way of circumstantial evidence, building
walls by bricks in ordinary trials. When there are interlocking and
mutually corroborating results from a variety of domains and studies
that individually are all subject to plausible external validity
objections, it would seem that exclusion based on external validity
grounds ought to be approached with caution and an attempt at
sophistication. We are not saying that some external validity leaps are
not so great that they would form the proper basis for excluding any
proffers of expert testimony based on them. When the leap is closer,
however, and there is not much valid affirmative counterevidence
from more epistemically privileged domains, it would seem that
external validity issues in toxic tort causation cases would be better
controlled by sufficiency judgments rather than threshold
admissibility judgments, or left to the jury, especially given the
preponderance standard of proof obtaining in civil cases.
3.

Determining what available information bears on a rational belief
warrant in regard to the reliability of the claimed expertise (“good
reason to believe”)

Thus far, in our hypothetical toxic tort, we have filled in the
generally applicable question as follows: “Is there good reason to
believe that a witness with training and credentials in toxicology,
basing his testimony explicitly in large part on formal data from
animal studies involving the exposure of white mice to large amounts
of Benediction, can give testimony of sufficient reliability for the
purposes of the law on the issue of whether the risk of congenital foot

declarations except in cases where admissibility would actually make a difference.
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deformities in humans at least doubles as a result of in utero exposure
to Benediction of the kind involved in this case?” We still must deal
with how a court is to approach the issues entailed in the phrase
“good reason to believe [that the proffered expert testimony] is
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the law.” Let us start by asking
what constitutes “good reason to believe,” that is, what is sometimes
called a proper belief warrant, in regard to information such as this.
We are lucky in that this rather deep question of philosophy is
comparatively easy to answer satisfactorily in regard to proffered
expert evidence about risk-increase causation in toxic tort, and
doubly lucky in that addressing the question in this context will give
us leverage which will be useful in dealing with questions of proper
belief warrant in regard to other kinds of claimed expertise.
A reasonable determination of the proper factors that go into a
warranted belief in risk-increase causation claims is comparatively
easy because virtually any such information will of necessity be the
product of science narrowly defined, as explained above. And
therefore:
A. If we believe that information properly generated by the
methods required of practitioners of science by the applicable
practice norms of the area in which they operate has a high claim
to reliability,
B. Then it is appropriate to look to that science practice itself for
the proper variables affecting warranted belief for such a claimed
product.

These sound a bit circular, but they are not. The first merely
asks whether science has a privileged claim to reliability on some
types of questions. We need not undertake an extensive discussion to
conclude that an affirmative answer is judicially noticeable in regard
to issues of empirically observable fact and the structures of
generalization (theories) that are built on them. Indeed, the Daubert
Court’s invocation of the concept of falsifiability seems to have been
intended to suggest the scope of the domain of inquiry that can in
theory have a claim to being “scientific.” Therefore, all that remains
is to determine the factors that go into a proper belief warrant, both
as to internal and external validity, in the area of science which
generated the data upon which the proffered expert is relying. Of
course “all that remains” is easy to say, but the task is far from trivial.
It is, however, doable. Each area of real science will have an
associated literature dealing with proper methodology and issues
raised by various threats to validity. Some of these will be common to
most science (for instance, the requirement of procedures to guard
against observer effects when human perceptors, raters, or evaluators
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must be used). Others may be specific to a given area of inquiry
(dose level issues in toxicology, especially as they relate to
generalizations from animal data, for instance). In every case, the
court is of necessity obliged to become acquainted with these criteria
sufficiently to evaluate the general strength of the testimony’s claim
to reliability, that is, why and to what degree one would be warranted
in believing what the expert asserts.
This was what the Daubert Court appears to have believed it was
attempting generally in the outlining of the (in)famous “four”
92
factors: (1) falsifiability or testability, and testing (whether a claim
“can (and has been) tested”); (2) establishment of (potential or
actual) error rates; (3) peer review and publication; and (4) general
acceptance. Of those factors, only the general notions of “the extent
to which a claim has been tested” and the establishment vel non of
“known error rates” (which is just a byproduct of what would be
required to count as adequate testing in many areas of scientific
inquiry) approach directly an evaluation of validity. We take these to
mean little more (and no less!) than the proposition that any area
unconcerned with testing and error rates has no claim to scientific
validity in the sense of being a proper product of science. Whether
there can be some other basis for a belief warrant for such nonscience-based expert claims is an issue we will come to in due course.
The other two Daubert factors attempt to use peer evaluations of
validity (either by reference to a small group of pre-publication
reviewers, or a larger community) as an alternative source of
information to the court’s own evaluations. Unfortunately, like the
Frye test before them, these factors provide weak warrants in areas
with low claims to validity under the general norms of science but
with a guild structure that allows them to claim peer acceptance both
in regard to publication and specific review, and in regard to
93
community acceptance.
The “Daubert factors” are usually supplemented by Daubert’s
further requirement of proper “fit” between the data and the
94
problem presented by the case. Here, the Court seems to have been
getting at something akin to problems of external validity and
extension. Taken together, these general “Daubert criteria” have
91

See Risinger et al., Observer Effects, supra note 18, at 9.
For a fuller analysis of the three or four or five or eight or nine “factors,” see
supra note 64.
93
The Court in Kumho Tire recognized as much when it said that the general
acceptance factor was not a good indicator of reliability “where the discipline itself
lacks reliability.” 526 U.S. at 151.
94
See supra notes 64, 70.
92
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often been treated as a mechanical checklist by both lawyers and
judges with all the skill displayed in the product of an
95
undistinguished paint-by-number picture.
Perhaps it is unduly harsh to be too critical of the Daubert
Court’s less-than-perfect framing of these reliability considerations.
After all, it was a brave maiden voyage into waters uncharted at least
by the law, being undertaken by admirals unfamiliar with even the
kind of hazards that might lie there. To its credit, the Court did say
that none of the factors were either necessary or sufficient, but this
was lost by many who followed what they took to be their sailing
directions. It might yet be possible that Kumho Tire’s emphasis on
seeking the best criteria of validity reasonably applicable to the
particular proffer of expertise under challenge (perhaps
supplemented by utilization of neutral experts to educate the judge
on the reliability problems specific to particular areas of scientific
inquiry involved in the case) can lead in the direction of more
defensible consideration and use of information actually bearing on
the validity of proffered scientific evidence (when actual scientific
evidence is really what is being proffered). However, even this may
not always lead to better rulings on “Daubert motions,” because there
is still one criterion to be examined which, poorly handled, can lead
to questionable results.
4.

Determining the proper case-specific legal standard of certainty for
such a belief warrant (“sufficient reliability for the purposes of the
law”)

Even if the whole validity issue is evaluated in a sophisticated and
rational manner, there remains the question of “how reliable is
reliable enough” for the purposes of the law, in order for the
proposed testimony to be admissible. It seems to us that that issue
must of necessity depend on a variety of factors, such as whether the
expert will testify to a conclusion or as an educational witness to
supplement the factfinder’s general knowledge, whether the issue
96
involved is a specific fact or a magnitude judgment, and so forth.
One centrally important factor would seem to be the underlying case
standard of proof and its attendant distribution of burdens. We do
not intend to discuss this extensively here, except to say that if courts
95

For a particularly egregious recent example, see the two-paragraph attempt by
Judge Bownes regarding the reliability of handwriting identification expertise in
United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2002).
96
A range of such variables is discussed in Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37,
throughout, but particularly summarized at pp. 535-36.
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adopt reliability standards (as opposed to reliability-affecting criteria)
from science, they run the risk of excluding proffered testimony
according to too high a preliminary standard when the applicable
97
case standard is low.
Take the following hypothetical: Let us assume that toxicology as
an enterprise displays a great fear of ever making an affirmative claim
of causation which turns out to be wrong. Toxicologists pride
themselves on being able to say, “When we declare that ‘A’ causes ‘B,’
you can bank on it.” As a result, they refuse even to consider basing
any notion of causation on any relationship shown by data, if the
relationship might have occurred by chance even one time in a
thousand. They may be said to have a terror of false positives, and
not to care much about overlooking relationships that others might
find persuasive. (It would be hard to call these false negatives,
because the toxicologists simply remain agnostic about such
relationships, but they are errors of another sort, perhaps.)
Now assume the only evidence available on causation is from
toxicology, and it shows an association which could not be accounted
for by random occurrence one time in a hundred. The toxicologist
would say the information was insufficient to draw a conclusion and,
therefore, fundamentally useless. The usual scientist (who would
probably find information meaningful that would only be the
product of random occurrence one time in twenty, since this
corresponds to the conventional .05 level adopted for statistical
significance) would accept the information, and might base decisions
on it that would be justified in her field. If a gatekeeper stood
between the toxicologist’s information and the usual scientist, and
applied the toxicologist’s criterion for “reliable enough for use,” the
usual scientist would be deprived of the information even though it
was good enough for her purposes, so she would be cut off from
doing with the information what it was proper for her to do within
her sphere.
The admission decision would have improperly
prevented her consideration of information, by importing without
thought the standard of “reliable enough” from the domain of the
information’s original generation, just because it was there.
Similarly, in the legal context, the conventional level of certainty
required to say a relationship is established in the sciences is
conservative compared to that represented by the normal tort
standard of proof (a preponderance of the evidence), which equates
97

A similar point is made more extensively in Neil B. Cohen, The Gatekeeping Role
in Civil Litigation and the Abdication of Legal Values in Favor of Scientific Values, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 943 (2003).
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the disvalue of false positives and false negatives. Hence, adopting
too high a standard, even by claiming to import it from the science
that gave rise to the data, runs the risk of depriving the person with
the burden of production and persuasion reasonably reliable
information on the issues of the case. Such concerns seem at least in
part to have driven the New Jersey Supreme Court in its creation of
special rules for dealing with reliability in risk-increase causation
98
cases, starting with Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp. and proceeding
99
through Landrigan v. Celotex Corp. to the recent case of Kemp ex rel.
100
Wright v. State.
We are not saying that there is always an easy solution to the
101
issue of what is “reliable enough for the purposes of the law.” All
we can do is call on courts not to be too quick to exclude proffered
expertise in civil cases based on unsophisticated acceptance of the
proposition that a relationship shown by the data upon which it is
based is not “statistically significant,” especially when there is
information from multiple domains being proffered on the same
issue. In addition, we think it proper to observe here that the
corollary of our position is that information reliable enough to be
admitted for one legal purpose, with a low attached standard of
proof, is not necessarily reliable enough to be admitted for a
different legal purpose with a high attached standard of proof. To
put it bluntly, we believe that information properly admitted in civil
cases is not necessarily reliable enough for admission by the
prosecution in criminal cases. We know this position is currently
102
looked upon as something of a heresy, though there are plenty of
legal contexts in which courts have applied such differential
98

125 N.J. 421 (1991).
127 N.J. 404 (1992).
100
174 N.J. 412 (2002).
101
Professor Neil B. Cohen showed quite a while ago that there is plenty of room
to use analogues to the notion of confidence in probability theory in approaching
the concept of preponderance. Viewed this way, we may think of preponderance
sufficiency as requiring fair certainty that the true value of the probability derived
from the evidence falls within a range all of which is above 50 percent. See Neil B.
Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985); see also Neil B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and
Calculating Probabilities: A Response to Professor Kaye, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 78 (1987).
Such a metaphor is available even when part or all of the proffered testimony is
derived from information not formally quantified. To the extent that Rule 702
“sufficient reliability” is in most contexts properly conceived of as more than simple
relevance and less than full sufficiency, such analyses must come into play in
informing that judgment also.
102
See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Daubert on a Tilted Playing Field, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
1113 (2003).
99
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standards, making admission easier in civil cases than by the
prosecution in criminal cases. Nevertheless, whatever one’s ultimate
position on that point, we would hope to obtain universal agreement
that, to the extent prosecution proffers are held to lower standards of
reliability than those of civil plaintiffs or criminal defendants (which
103
seems to be the case in general), something is seriously out of
kilter.
FRAMING THE TASK-SPECIFIC RELIABILITY QUESTION FOR “EXPERIENCEBASED” EXPERTISE
We have given a general form of question, which we have said
applies in formulating the reliability question in every case
whatsoever: “Is there good reason to believe that the product of the
claim of expertise being proffered is sufficiently reliable to be
considered by the jury on the question (i.e., the target empirical issue
upon which the expert testimony is proffered)?” We have explored
the proper filling out of that question in regard to scientific evidence,
properly so called, generated by the methods of science and based on
formal data. Let us now see how the content of the general reliability
question changes when faced with expert claims that are not, in
significant and central part, the product of science, but the product
of some other source of information claimed to possess an
appropriate level of reliability. To make the exercise as concrete as
possible, let us do so in regard to the very facts and the very claims at
issue in the Kumho Tire case itself.
When a tire on the vehicle being driven by Patrick Carmichael
blew out, the vehicle overturned, one passenger died, and others
104
were injured. The tire that blew out was old and nearly bald, with
105
two previous improperly repaired punctures. The blowout resulted
106
from a separation of the tread plies from the carcass of the tire. It
was uncontested that in a non-defective tire that had never been
misused at all, the tread would not separate merely as a result of
107
normal driving that wore the tread smooth. So the blowout either
103

See generally Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 3. At least in the
civil cases it is generally recognized that “[r]ulings on admissibility under Daubert
inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the proffered
expert’s methodology.” McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257
(11th Cir. 2002). This is not commonly done regarding prosecution proffers
challenged pursuant to Daubert/Kumho.
104
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142.
105
Id. at 143.
106
Id. at 144.
107
Id. at 143-44.
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resulted from cumulative improper use (excessive sidewall flexing
from wrong inflation, damage from curb impact, etc.) or a
manufacturing defect, such as improperly bonded plies in the tire
108
carcass, that took a long time to manifest itself.
Only the latter
circumstance would render Kumho Tire, the manufacturer, liable, so
the plaintiffs had the burden of producing sufficient evidence which,
if believed, would justify the conclusion that the accident more likely
than not resulted from such a defect. To that end, they intended to
109
rely at trial on the testimony of Dennis Carlson, Jr., an engineer
110
with substantial experience in the tire manufacturing industry who
111
consulted as an expert in what he called “tire failure analysis.”
Defendant Kumho Tire claimed that it was beyond the current state
of any art to assign this failure to a manufacturing defect rather than
112
cumulative misuse. Carlson, however, claimed that he could do it,
that he had done it, and that the failure resulted from a
113
manufacturing defect. In reaching this conclusion, he relied upon
114
115
his visual inspection of the tire and rim, his experience, and
certain factual propositions which he claimed were true, but which
the tire company claimed were not known by him or anyone else to
116
be true in reality.
The first factual claim was that the form of abuse that most
commonly resulted in tread separation was long-term underinflation,
which resulted in too much tire flexing while driving, and that this
was so much the most common factor that other possible sources of
abuse could be ignored, at least unless there was specific evidence of
117
them.
The second factual claim was that any tire which had been
subject to such underinflation would always manifest some
combination of four physical symptoms which could be observed: (1)
treadwear on the edges of the tread greater than in the center of the
108

Id. at 144. Presumably, both defect and abuse might have been contributing
causes. This would raise issues of comparative responsibility under the applicable
state law having nothing to do with the Rule 702 issue. The Supreme Court treated
the 702 issue as being properly represented by the dichotomous choice, and
therefore so have we here.
109
Id. at 142.
110
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156.
111
Id. at 142.
112
Id. at 145.
113
Id. at 144.
114
Id. at 144, 153-54.
115
Id. at 156.
116
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 144.
117
See id. at 144.
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tread; (2) wear of a groove on the tire’s “bead” (the part that rests
against the rim of the wheel upon which the tire is mounted); (3)
sidewalls with signs of deterioration such as discoloration; and (4)
118
marks on the flange part of the rim itself.
The third factual claim was that in the absence of evidence of
119
“significant” amounts of at least two of these symptoms, a defect was
120
the most likely cause of the tread separation and blowout. (This is
121
the part that the Court later referred to as the “two-factor test”; it is
really an “any two of four factors test.”)
While Carlson conceded that there were some signs of each of
these symptoms manifested in the Carmichael tire and rim, he
asserted that none of them was enough to be significant, based on his
experience (or in the case of the edgewear, it was not significant
because the inside and outside edges were worn in differing
122
amounts).
1.

Framing the target issue

In this case, the target issue is fairly easy to frame once the facts
are recounted in sufficient detail: “whether, more likely than not, the
tire that failed on the plaintiff’s vehicle left the Kumho Tire factory
with a defect that finally manifested itself in (caused) the tire failure
that resulted in the accident.” Note that this question is not framed
to require proof of any particular kind of defect, such as improper
bonding of plies, but can be satisfied if the combined probability of
all possible late-manifesting defects that could result in the failure
observed was greater than the combined probabilities from nondefect-caused failure due to the combined effects of normal wear and
tear and occasional misuse from improper inflation, curb trauma, etc.
Note further that, unlike risk-increase causation in a toxic tort case,
this question does not involve any particularly fancy legal issues,
except the normal ones involved in ordinary “but for” causation,
where the condition for which defendant is responsible must only
have been a contributing cause, not the sole cause, of the tire’s
failure.

118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 157.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 144-45.
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Framing the claim of expertise (the characteristics of the proffered
product of claimed expertise, given its context and methodology)

What was the basis of Carlson’s claim that he could offer reliable
information of the existence of a manufacturing defect in a tire
under the factual conditions applicable to this case? Carlson’s
proposed testimony offers a classic example of claimed expertise
which will masquerade as the product of science as far as it can and
take advantage of not being the product of science whenever that is
beneficial.
As such, it provides an incredibly important and
instructive template for examining and evaluating analogous claims
that are the common grist of expert evidence in many important
areas. In showing why this is so, we will have to proceed rather slowly.
First, let us deal with the issue of credentials, and how they do or
do not bear on the issue of whether what is being done in a particular
case is a product of science, or whether it is even significantly affected
by the education and experience reflected by the credentials.
Carlson was an automotive engineer. What part does science play in
123
engineering, and under what circumstances?
More or less by
definition, engineers are people who are educated in aspects of
science applicable to the design and maintenance of certain types of
124
artifacts or products. While “scientists doing science” are interested
in the frontiers of knowledge, “engineers doing engineering” (all
other things being equal) prefer to deal with well established
principles, because they result in fewer risks in the resulting design or
solution to the engineering problem at hand. Of course, this
simpleminded division of labor between scientists and engineers does
not define very clear boundaries in the real world. There are plenty
of people with physics degrees doing “engineering,” and plenty of
people with engineering degrees doing research or theory-building
125
in ways that would count as “doing science.” So where did Carlson
fit in?
There is no reason to believe that Carlson had ever done any
pertinent actual research himself, or was familiar with any body of
formal data bearing on determining the existence of a manufacturing
defect from the examination of a failed tire. Even the science he had
123

This may seem like a silly question, but since a lot of what goes on in regard to
expertise masquerading as partly the product of science is dependent on answers to
questions like this, it is important to consider such foundational issues directly.
124
See Henry Petroski, Reference Guide on Engineering Practice and Methods, in
REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 75, at 577. “Science in its purest form theorizes about
nature as it is found; engineering at its most basic re-forms the raw materials of
nature into useful things.” Id. at 579.
125
Id. at 581-84.
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learned in order to become an engineer did not seem to undergird
in any definable way either his methodology or his results. No doubt
the question of reconstructing the original characteristics of a tire as
manufactured from the remnants of a failed tire could be the subject
of research generating formal data by the standards of real science.
One can imagine a regime of research consisting of running tires
until failure on machines incorporating various metering devices,
data from which might reveal objectively discernable indices
apparent in the failed tires of various original conditions that would
count as defects. The point is, Carlson did not claim to be operating
based on any such formal data or research of his own or of others.
Both the principles of his methodology and his own performance of
it, to the extent they could be said to be based on anything even
arguably called data at all, were based on his own subjective
observations over the course of his experience, available only to him,
and in their individual form now almost certainly only imperfectly
recalled, if at all. In terms one of us has developed at length in
126
another setting, Carlson claimed accuracy for a personal subjective
translational system based on experience (translational in that it
translates the meaning of the characteristics of the failed tire into the
characteristics of the tire as it left the factory). The claim at issue was
that Carlson’s experience with tires had allowed him to develop, from
his subjective database, four criteria for determining accurately (by
his own subjective evaluation of the “significant” presence of these
criteria) whether a given failed tire had been defective when it left
the factory. Thus he made both methodological claims and skill
claims. That is, he claimed that his “two of four” factor test, to the
extent that it directed evaluation, was a reliable method, and that to
the extent that reliable outcomes depended on his particular
subjective judgment as part of the method, he claimed he could
make those subjective judgments accurately (a claim of “skill” in
making those subjective judgments). We might say that the claim can
be likened to that of a cook who has written a cookbook based on
experience, with many of the recipes calling for the cook to add “a
significant amount” of certain ingredients. To the extent that a claim
that this results in “good cooking” is based on actually following the
cookbook, we would have to have a reason to believe the cookbook
(the methodology) was sound. But to the extent the proper outcome
was based on a claim of skill supplementing (or even substituting for)
the underspecified recipes of the cookbook, we would have to have
some reason to believe that the cook actually possessed the claimed
126

See Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37, at 522-23.
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skill, and we would have to know which skill was at issue in regard to
each claim. In this case, we would be properly concerned with the
reasons to accept Carlson’s “two of four” factor test, and the reasons
to accept Carlson’s judgmental skill about which levels of each factor
are significant and which are not, in the combination manifested by
the tire in the case before the court.
The Supreme Court was very clear that this particularized
approach to evaluation was required under Rule 702.
The
circumstances applicable to Mr. Carlson and his methodology
illustrate both these points. The proponents of Mr. Carlson’s
testimony tried to argue that the proper way to characterize his
asserted expertise was very general, consisting of expertise in
determining the existence of a defect from visual and tactile
inspection, and that “a method of tire failure analysis which employs
127
a visual/tactile inspection is a reliable method” since such a general
approach might often be accurate. The Court rejected this approach
in no uncertain terms:
For one thing, and contrary to respondents’ suggestion, the
specific issue before the court was not the reasonableness in
general of a tire expert’s use of a visual and tactile inspection to
determine whether overdeflection had caused the tire’s tread to
separate from its steel-belted carcass.
Rather, it was the
reasonableness of using such an approach, along with Carlson’s
particular method of analyzing the data thereby obtained, to draw a
conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony
was directly relevant . . . . The relevant issue was whether the expert
128
could reliably determine the cause of this tire’s separation.

And later:
Respondents now argue to us, as they did to the District Court,
that a method of tire failure analysis that employs a visual/tactile
inspection is a reliable method, and they point both to its use by
other experts and to Carlson’s long experience working for
Michelin as sufficient indication that that is so. But no one denies
that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations
based on extensive and specialized experience. Nor does anyone
deny that, as a general matter, tire abuse may often be identified
by qualified experts through visual and tactile inspection of the
tire. As we said before, the question before the trial court was
specific, not general. The trial court had to decide whether this
particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the

127

Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156.
Id. at 153-54 (some emphasis added). For a fuller exposition with even more
extensive citation, see Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 773-78.
128
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jurors “in deciding the particular issues in the case.”
The particular issue in this case concerned the use of Carlson’s
two factor test and his related use of visual/tactile inspection to
draw conclusions on the basis of what seemed to be small
129
observational differences.

Thus, according to the Supreme Court, a court’s job under Rule
702 is to identify the particular claim being made in the context of
the particular circumstances of the case. The real question is the
reliability of the specific application of claimed expertise defined by
the facts of the case. So the issue was whether Carlson’s particular
four-part “two factor” test, coupled with his subjective evaluation of
the relative magnitude and significance of each of the four factors,
had been shown to be a reliable way of determining a manufacturing
defect when applied to a tire, such as the Carmichael tire, which was
very old and very worn.
Note here that we have not drawn the reliability issue in such a
way that an answer would apply exclusively to the Carmichael tire, by
including details such as “having exactly two inexpertly repaired
punctures” or “being exactly 7.3 years old” or “belonging to a person
whose surname begins with ‘C.’” This would be artificially narrow,
even given the Supreme Court’s language about “this tire.” To frame
the reliability question so artificially as to apply to “this tire” in so
restrictive a way, and not also have it apply to other tires similarly
situated in regard to the claimed expertise, would be
counterproductive to the policies underlying the reliability
requirement in the first place. It would raise inappropriately trivial
issues concerning the existence of applicable data—for example, it is
unlikely that any tests that were ever done involved exactly two
improperly repaired punctures—and deprive the decision of any
possible precedential meaning for future cases. The problem here is
one of line drawing, both in regard to the claims of expertise and in
regard to the uses to which the decision might be put in the future.
To solve this “over-specificity/over-generality” dilemma, we propose
the following approach: The reliability issue should be framed
A. Narrowly enough to prevent reliability from being established
only by reference to evidence from a different and non-apposite
part of the claimed domain of expertise; and
B. Broadly enough to have some potential issue-settling or
precedential carry-over effects in other cases within the class
encompassed by the question (though this carry-over application
would not necessarily have to be to a broad or common class in
129

Id. at 156-57 (citations omitted).

2003

KUMHO TIRE AND EXPERT RELIABILITY

the real world).

55

130

In addition, when approaching this framing task, a court should
remember that the Supreme Court has held that the main focus
should be the reliability of the expertise as applied to and under the
conditions of the case before the court. This militates for the
narrowest framing reasonable under the circumstances, and this is
what we think our final framing of the Kumho Tire question
accomplishes.
3.

Determining the belief warrant for “experience-based” expertise
(“good reason to believe”)

What could count as a good reason to believe the claims that
underlie Carlson’s testimony? We do not want to be unrealistically
demanding in regard to claims of either experience-generated
methodology or skills. However, at the start there seem to be only
two general approaches which might distinguish the reliable from the
unreliable when such claims are made: either we trust the experience
of the claimant because the claimant appears to trust it, or we look
for something more. Given the human capacity for self-delusion
which we have all observed, the former would not appear to have
much to recommend it, and indeed the Supreme Court itself has
rejected the “ipse dixit of the expert” alone as a basis for a rational
131
belief warrant. Then what “something more” might suffice?
Before approaching this question, we must assert one great
guiding principle which we believe to be the most powerful lens that
can be brought to bear in judging circumstances put forth as
supplying that “something more.” At the very least, every such
candidate for the “something more” which can provide a belief
warrant for experience-based methodology or skill, must be capable
of passing the “astrology test”; that is, it must be something that
132
astrologers could not plausibly assert in regard to their claims. We
have picked astrology because it was one of the two areas actually
named in Kumho Tire as areas “lacking reliability” generally, and
because, unlike the other area (necromancy), astrology still has a
large group of believers and a community of practitioners with organs
of publication and guild-like groups which can provide the form, if
not the substance, of publication, general acceptance, and
130

The judicial system will demand some precedential effect, and rightly so on
efficiency grounds, though a precedent system does not fit well with the open-ended
and dynamic nature of many empirical questions. But that is a topic for another day.
131
Id. at 157 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)).
132
See Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 776.
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conformity to community norms of good practice which are claimed
to enhance accuracy. This point has immediate relevance in that, just
as individual self-belief cannot provide an adequate belief warrant for
others, the mutual self-belief of a group is similarly insufficient.
Thus, showing conformity with group practice, without more, is not
enough. This is the main weakness of both the “general acceptance”
133
134
test and the “equal intellectual rigor” test that are sometimes put
forth as generally sufficient grounds for a belief in the reliability of
particular testimony. Some claims that pass muster under those tests
cannot pass the “astrology test.” This was recognized by the Supreme
Court itself in Kumho Tire when it said that such factors were not in
themselves sufficient when the claim is that the discipline itself “lacks
135
reliability.”
With this in mind, let us continue to examine what kinds of
information can yield a proper belief warrant for a claim of
experience-based methods or skills beyond self-belief. There appear
to be two main sources of such information: practical success and
scientific testing of claims. It should not be too surprising that we
believe that actual scientific testing of claims is epistemically
privileged, and trumps all when it has been done and done properly.
However, like epidemiology in the case of risk-increase causation in
toxic tort, such testing is expensive and difficult to do across the
whole range of claimed practical areas of expertise that are proffered
in legal proceedings. In the absence of high-quality testing, are there
ever any circumstances that can take its place and provide adequate
belief warrants for the purposes of the law?
In regard to claimed expertise at determining specific facts, at
136
any rate, there would seem to be two necessary conditions for such
a belief warrant: first, that in the ordinary practice of the claimed
methodology or skill, there are objectively unmistakable right and
wrong results in most cases of application, and second, that there is a
133

See Peter B. Oh, Assessing Admissibility of Nonscientific Expert Evidence Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 556, 565-67 (1997) (explicitly advocating Frye
test for non-scientific evidence).
134
This test would only require that the expert have utilized the same intellectual
rigor in reaching conclusions for use in court as that used for reaching conclusions
in non-forensic settings. See J. Brook Lathram, The “Same Intellectual Rigor” Test
Provides an Effective Method for Determining the Reliability of All Expert Testimony, Without
Regard to Whether the Testimony Comprises “Scientific Knowledge” or “Technical or Other
Specialized Knowledge,” 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 1053, 1063-68 (1998).
135
526 U.S. at 151.
136
Weaker warrants may suffice in regard to some subjects including “no one
right answer” areas such as land valuation. See Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37; see
also supra note 96.
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generally inescapable penalty for wrong results. Under these
circumstances, it is at least tenable, at any rate, to believe that humans
may develop generally reliable practical methods and skills. Though
the practitioners may not be able to give any useful account of the
reasons for their success (being only what would have been called in
an earlier time “mere empericks”), if all the law cares about is the
137
success of the methods and skills developed in such circumstances,
then the judgments of such cooks (or beekeepers, or chicken sexers)
may be proper candidates for admission into evidence.
Of course, clearly apparent right or wrong results, and
unambiguous feedback regarding success or failure, are only necessary
conditions for a belief warrant about experience-based methods or
skills; they are not in themselves always sufficient. There are other
conditions which may reinforce or undermine reliability even in the
presence of such conditions, and therefore affect both the tenability
of belief warrants and the question of admissibility under Rule 702.
However, that is an issue for another day. What we are mainly
interested in here are those areas of claimed experience-based skill or
practice that do not operate under such conditions of success-orfailure feedback. What may be said of belief warrants for experiencebased claims like these?
When one reflects upon it, it is surprising how many experiencebased claims offered in court (including that of Carlson in Kumho
Tire, as we shall see) fit this model. For instance, it is true of nearly all
the forensic identification “sciences” based on subjective human
evaluation, such as bitemark, toolmark, and handwriting
identification analysis. In the normal practice of these areas, there is
no clear objective index of mistaken results. The practitioners do not
ordinarily have empirically unmistakable feedback about the accuracy
of the majority of their skill-based decisions or applications of
method. And so it was with Carlson. There was no independent way
for him ever to know in fact if there was a manufacturing defect in
the Carmichael tire, or any other tire, when he had finished applying
his methodology and coming to his conclusion. There was no way for
inaccurate conclusions to manifest themselves independently, and for
Carlson to suffer for them, and learn from them.
In such
137

Or by extension, the accuracy of such skills acquired through training in guilds
which have accumulated the results of such circumstances into teachable practical
models. For a full treatment of the implications and problems of such a “guild”
claim, which may often masquerade as “science,” see D. Michael Risinger, Mark P.
Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Brave New “Post-Daubert World”—A Reply to Professor
Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405, 441-47 (1998) [hereinafter Risinger et al.,
“Post-Daubert World”].
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circumstances, experience itself (no matter how extensive) cannot
provide a proper belief warrant for the accuracy or reliability of a
process or a witness.
Does this mean that no such witness can ever be shown to be
reliable in what they are claiming to be able to do? No, but in the
absence of a clear accuracy feedback loop, the only thing that can
supply a proper belief warrant is testing, properly designed and
administered according to the normal standards of science. In
addition, it is important to keep in mind that any assertion that such
testing has been done must be examined carefully, to make sure that
the tests themselves are not only internally valid, but actually test
something close enough to the skill claimed in court so that the tests
have reasonable external validity in regard to that skill. And this
depends not only on the broad or narrow characterization of the skill
or experience-based methodology but also on the differences
between test conditions and the conditions of ordinary practice.
The latter point requires a bit of exposition. The emphasis in
Kumho Tire is on reliability of the expertise in the circumstances of
the case. New Rule 702 requires that proffered expertise be the
138
product “of reliable methods.”
Elsewhere, one of us and his coauthors have been at some pains to establish that there is one
enormous reliability-undermining condition which applies to all
expertise, but most heavily distorts expertise which is experience139
based and relies on human subjective judgment.
We refer to socalled “observer effects,” particularly those which result from
conditions giving rise to expectation and suggestion from which the
expert has not been insulated by appropriate masking techniques. In
addition, much research indicates that the distortions resulting from
such unmasked suggestion and expectancy are reinforced
significantly by the kind of team identification and desire to win
140
which are virtually inevitable in the adversary process.
Testing of
the reliability of skills which has been done in settings without such
variables (which would be the norm in the usual design of such tests)
cannot establish that the skills survive in the presence of the
precursors of such effects.
In any area where normal practice can be adjusted to eliminate
these effects by masking or blind testing regimes, courts should
138

FED. R. EVID. 702(2). This rule, which became effective on December 1, 2000,
requires, inter alia, that in order to be admissible, expert testimony must be “the
product of reliable principles and methods.” Id.
139
See generally Risinger et al., Observer Effects, supra note 18.
140
Id. at 18-19, 24-27.
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consider the failure to do so in determining the reliability of
proffered testimony, even when some arguable relevant test data
141
under blind conditions are available.
However, masking is not an
option in regard to some kinds of expertise. For example, in regard
to accident reconstruction, the precursors of observer effects are
likely to be present as long as the experts know who hired them, and
this circumstance is appropriate in determining the discount to
impose on any available skills test results.
Of course, in Carlson’s case, things were easy. There had been
no tests of any kind of his four-variable “two factor” methodology, nor
of him individually as an accurate subjective evaluator. When dealing
with an experience-based expertise which has no accuracy feedback
loop and no even arguably relevant test data, the admissibility
question should answer itself: ex nihilo nihil fit. And so it did in Kumho
Tire.
4.

Determining the legal standard of certainty for the belief warrant
(“reliable enough for the purposes of the law”)

This question need not detain us long in regard to the kind of
issue presented by Mr. Carlson. What we have said in regard to riskincrease causation is equally applicable here. Carlson’s claimed
expertise was proffered in a civil case. It dealt with “drawing a
conclusion” or “giving an opinion,” that is, translating the meaning of
one set of facts equally available to expert and factfinder into another
non-obvious factual proposition. It did not deal with any of the
special areas of concern in the theory of expertise that involve
economic or normative valuations of various kinds, which in different
contexts can be the subject of special arguments about heightened or
lowered standards of admissibility to discharge the law’s special
purposes in regard to them. It was not mere “educational” expertise,
expertise used only to educate the jury to the potentially
counterintuitive results of relevant research which might show that
142
the jury’s general background “major premise”
“social
143
144
framework” “jury notice” information was deficient or inaccurate.
141

For a discussion of the feasibility of such masked regimes in forensic practice,
see id. at 45-50.
142
That is, the major premises for which the specific evidence in the case provides
minor premises for deductions about the ultimate facts in the individual case.
143
See Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987).
144
See John H. Mansfield, Jury Notice, 74 GEO. L.J. 395 (1985). These terms
(“general background,” “major premise,” “social framework,” and “jury notice” are
not independent, but essentially different labels attempting to capture the kind of
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All of these cases present special questions for which a court might
properly claim to exercise intelligent selection, appropriate to the
kind of expertise, of both the appropriate belief warrant information
and the required level of reliability for admission (the proper scope
of the “discretion” and “flexibility” referred to in Kumho Tire).
However, whenever a court is faced with a proffered expert
exhibiting the same kinds of attributes as Carlson, the result should
be the same as that reached by the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire, that
is to say, exclusion. However, in spite of Kumho Tire, this result is not
always forthcoming, as we shall see when we examine the recent
record of the lower courts in regard to prosecution-proffered forensic
science identification expertise.
THE IGNORING OF KUMHO TIRE WHEN PROSECUTION-PROFFERED
EXPERTISE IS CHALLENGED
A. The Handwriting Cases
Like Mr. Carlson in Kumho Tire, and like other forensic
identification specialties such as toolmark and bitemark
identification, forensic document examiners who claim to identify
handwriting by comparison of hands have no unambiguous feedback
145
regarding right or wrong conclusions in normal practice. They also
usually operate in non-blind conditions with no attempt to mask out
the common precursors of observer effects resulting from
146
expectation and suggestion.
The only initial difference between
their claims and those of Mr. Carlson is that there is a guild-like
group of them who share the same beliefs and general methods of
147
examination. But, as we have already indicated, the existence of a
group practice, without more, does not provide sufficient warrant to
believe the claims of the group, because such an approach fails the
“astrology test.” There is no a priori way to distinguish the basis for
the handwriting expert’s group claims from an astrologer’s group
claims. As we have said, in regard to Carlson, astrology, and
handwriting identification, only some regime of external testing can
supply the “something else” which is required for a rational belief
general information jurors are allowed of necessity to bring to their task from
sources outside the courtroom. See Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note 37, at 517 n.16
and accompanying text.
145
For a discussion of this problem, see D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks,
Science and Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82
IOWA L. REV. 21, 64 (1996).
146
Id.
147
See Risinger et al., “Post-Daubert World,” supra note 137, at 441-47.
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warrant.
What kind of testing regime is required is dependent in large
part on the nature of the group claims being made. There are three
major variables:
1. How many reasonably separable subtasks are performed by the
group?
2. What “experience-based” “subjective data base driven” “clinical”
“subjective judgment” “skill”148 components are involved in each
subtask?
3. Under what conditions are these tasks usually performed?

As to the first variable, the literature of the group under
investigation is the primary source, though it cannot be entirely
149
dispositive. If, however (as is true in the case of handwriting), that
literature identifies subtasks, or subsets of practice conditions which
are taken to create situations of easier and more difficult
performance, these are entitled to be taken at their word. It may be
that the outsider can supplement this system of subtask conditions
with others not in the guild literature, but which may be reasonably
likely, on other grounds, to affect results. But it would seem to
border on the ludicrous to treat such an area as involving a global
unitary skill which can be proven to exist by any test of any task
150
anywhere within its bounds.
Unfortunately, this is exactly what
most courts do, as we shall see.
As to the second variable, when an experience-based subjective
judgment component is admitted to be present in normal practice
(as it was in Carlson’s case, and is in most “experience-based” claims
of expertise, including handwriting identification), then defensibly
designed tests must determine the reliability of that skill in
148

This litany is not intended to suggest that each term represents something
different to be dealt with in each case. It reflects terms which are almost
synonymous, but which are in common usage and which capture slightly different
aspects of the “experience-based expertise” phenomenon.
149
See Risinger, Task at Hand, supra note 61, at 782 n.69.
150
It is instructive to note the concurrence of Wigmore on the same point in
slightly different terms:
The capacity is in every case a relative one, i.e., relative to the topic about
which the person is asked to make his statement. The object is to be sure that
the question to the witness will be answered by a person who is fitted to
answer it. His fitness, then, is fitness on that point. He may be fitted to
answer about countless other matters, but that does not justify
accepting his views in the matter in hand.
II JOHN H. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 555, at 634 (3d ed. 1940); see also Risinger, Taxonomy, supra note
37, at 510.
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practitioners. By far the most desirable form of such a testing regime
would consist of individual proficiency testing which would generate
accuracy scores for each subtask for each practitioner, like the
151
“personal equations” of nineteenth century astronomy.
The
Australian document examiners and science-trained researchers
Bryan Found and Doug Rogers, and their collaborators at the
Forensic Expertise Profiling Laboratory at La Trobe University, have
begun developing a testing regime like that for Australian document
152
examiners, though the effort is still in its infancy. Unfortunately, in
this country, there is no such system of individual proficiency testing,
153
at least none with known results.
The next best thing would be a
system of group proficiency tests for each subtask. The weakness of
such an approach is that, even if the group is successful, it ascribes
the average performance for the group to both the group’s strongest
154
and (more troublingly) its weakest performers. This is especially a
problem when only what are believed to be the strongest performers
are selected to take the group proficiency tests. Finally, while
unacceptable performance might be determined from tests of the
claimed experts alone, acceptable performance for the purposes of
the law is dependent on a marginal advantage in accuracy over the
jury, so tests must also be administered to appropriately selected lay
155
groups to determine the existence of such an advantage.
We have already written fairly extensively about the weaknesses
156
of handwriting identification expertise.
When we started, we
characterized the conclusions concerning such claims flowing from
anything that could be called formal data as either mildly negative, or
151

Personal equations were corrections worked out in the early nineteenth
century for observational bias in astronomical observers which turned out to be fairly
stable for each observer. For a description of the personal equation phenomenon,
see EDWARD G. BORING, A HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 134-35 (1929).
152
See Bryan Found & Doug Rogers, Revision and Corrective Action Package: Signature
Trial 2001 (distributed on CD-ROM by the Forensic Expertise Profiling Laboratory,
School of Human Biosciences, La Trobe University, Australia) (described fully in the
2003 supplement to D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in 3 DAVID L.
FAIGMAN, DAVID H. KAY, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS, MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 400-83 (2d ed. 2002), and in Jodi Sita, Bryan Found, & Douglas K. Rogers,
Forensic Handwriting Examiners’ Expertise for Signature Comparison, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI.
1117 (2002)).
153
We say “with known results” because law enforcement laboratories may have
internal proficiency tests, the existence and results of which they keep secret. This
was apparently the case in regard to fingerprinting. See infra note 201.
154
This is the problem with most of the extant American research on document
examiner skill in handwriting identification, particularly that done by Moshe Kam
and his associates. See the extensive discussion in Risinger, supra note 152.
155
Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 38, at 731, 734-35.
156
See writings previously cited at notes 37, 38, 53, 61, 137, 145, and 152.
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nonexistent, depending on one’s attitude about both the internal
and external validity of the data generated by the proficiency tests
157
sponsored by the Forensic Science Foundation.
Since then there
158
However, when
has been some formal research undertaken.
compared to the extent of research devoted to many other areas of
endeavor, the amount of research devoted to handwriting
identification expertise remains sparse. Nevertheless, even taking the
extant research at face value, two things are clear. Most of it was
undertaken under test designs which appear to have been specially
tailored to make it impossible to make direct statements about
159
individual performance. In addition, most of it is directed, at best,
to showing an average advantage of document examiners over lay
persons in regard to what are, in the aggregate, the easiest possible
subtasks. No attempt is made to determine the error rate for
document examiners for the more difficult tasks, which are the tasks
commonly at issue in actual criminal prosecutions. Even the studies
which have been directed toward a definable subtask have all been
directed toward the subtask regarded as one of the easiest subtasks in
the claimed expertise’s own literature—determining whether a
signature was written by the person whose name is reflected, or by
160
some other person inexperienced as a forger.
What have never
been subjected to any tests are the two most common subtasks at
issue in criminal prosecutions: attribution of authorship of block
printing and attribution of the authorship of a forged signature to a
person whose name is not reflected by the signature (relying only on
the characteristics of the few letters in the signature, which often
reflect some attempt at disguise.) And, as a follow-on to this issue, no
empirical work at all has been done on the problem of determining
how much “questioned” writing is necessary to perform any
157

Risinger et al., Exorcism, supra note 38, at 750-51.
The extant research is fully recounted and analyzed in Risinger, supra note 152
and supplements.
159
This is especially true of the first three Kam studies: Moshe Kam, Joseph
Wetstein & Robert Conn, Proficiency of Professional Document Examiners in Writer
Identification, 39 J. FORENSIC SCI. 5 (1994) [hereinafter Kam I]; Moshe Kam, Gabriel
Fielding & Robert Conn, Writer Identification by Professional Document Examiners, 42 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 778 (1997) [hereinafter Kam II]; and Moshe Kam, Gabriel Fielding &
Robert Conn, The Effects of Monetary Incentives on Performance of Nonprofessionals in
Document-Examination Proficiency Tests, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1000 (1998) [hereinafter
Kam III]. Each of those studies has a complex design which insures that no two tests
administered are exactly the same, so that group performances can be compared but
comparisons of individual performances are undermined.
160
That is true of both Moshe Kam, Kishore Gummadidala, Gabriel Fielding &
Robert Conn, Signature Authentication by Forensic Document Examiners, 46 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 884 (2001) [hereinafter Kam IV] and Sita et al., supra note 152.
158
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identifications accurately—one letter? A capital “Q” but not a lower
case “o”? One word? Thirty letters? There is simply no empirical
evidence at all on this boundary problem, that is, on the variables
that determine the threshold of reliability of the claimed skill,
assuming it exists at all (when there is both plenty of questioned
writing and plenty of known writing of the putative author).
As for the third variable, tests ought to attempt to simulate the
conditions of actual practice as much as possible. Unfortunately, the
conditions of actual practice are not always easy to determine, and
the information that does exist suggests altogether less control and
fewer masking protocols than would be the usual norm in the
161
practice of science.
This makes it difficult to design tests which
demonstrate that any skills revealed by the tests (which of necessity
must be masked to a great extent) are robust enough for their
accuracy to survive the confounding conditions of actual practice. In
theory, tests of this question could be designed, but to date there are
none. This leaves the results of such tests as there are with a giant
problem of external validity on that ground. It would be nice if we
could make this problem go away by introducing adequate masking
162
or blind testing procedures into forensic practice, but so far
nothing of this sort has been done.
It would seem that, as a minimum, Kumho Tire would require any
judge facing a Rule 702 reliability challenge to handwriting
identification expertise to do what the Supreme Court did in Kumho
Tire in regard to Carlson, that is, identify the particular sub-task which
is at issue under the facts of the case and the attendant skill claims
involved, and then to look to the empirical record to see what
support there is for the claim that a document examiner can reliably
perform that task, by the methods employed, given the conditions
under which they were employed. So how have judges measured up
to this ideal since the decision in Kumho Tire?
163
Since Kumho Tire there have been twenty-one available federal
court decisions on challenges to proffered handwriting identification
164
165
expertise. Eight are appellate decisions, seven of which affirmed
161

Risinger et al., Observer Effects, supra note 18, at 35-42.
See id. at 45-52.
163
We have counted as “available” all decisions in written form which have come
into our hands, whether reflected on databases or counted as “reported” by local
rules, or not.
164
United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Mooney,
315 F.3d 54 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579 (8th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Hernandez, No. 01-1194, 2002 WL 1335595 (10th Cir. June 19,
2002); United States v. Johnson, 30 Fed. Appx. 686 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
162
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trial court global consideration and subsequent admission of such
testimony, and one of which affirmed trial court admission of such
testimony but restricted the expert from testifying to the conclusion
166
of identity. The district court cases generated no available opinions
in those cases, and the appellate decisions all managed to find no
abuse of discretion without describing the particular claim of
expertise which was at stake in the case.
Of the remaining thirteen trial court cases, only two have come
167
close to the ideal of identifying the “task at hand,” and, analyzing
reliability with reference to that task, they both excluded the
proffered testimony completely. A third case excluded the proffered
168
testimony without any particularized analysis,
and a fourth
exclusion was based on the failure of the government to proffer
witnesses at the Daubert hearing with sufficient familiarity with the
169
empirical record to testify.
In the other nine district court cases,
five admitted the proffered expertise only with significant
170
limitations (a testament, perhaps, to the weakness of the empirical
record in regard to the reliability of handwriting identification
expertise even considered globally), and the other four admitted the
Battle, No. 98-3246, 1999 WL 596966 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 1999); United States v. Paul,
175 F.3d 906 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hidalgo, No. CR-01-1011-PHX-FJM
(D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2002); United States v. Prime, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (W.D. Wash.
2002); United State v. Lewis, Crim. Action No. 2:02-00042, 2002 WL 31055185
(S.D.W. Va. Sept. 11, 2002); United States v. Nadurath, No. 4:02-CR-32-A, 2002 WL
1000929 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2002); United States v. Gricco, Crim. Action No. 01-90,
2002 WL 746037 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2002); United States v. Brewer, No. 01 CR 892,
2002 WL 596365 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2002); United States v. Richmond, Crim. Action
No. 00-321 Section “N,” 2001 WL 1117235 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2001); United States v.
Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Alaska 2001); United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d
939 (N.D. Ill. 2000); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Neb.
2000); United States v. Santillan, No. CR-96-40169 DLJ, 1999 WL 1201765 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 3, 1999); United States v. Brown, No. CR 99-184 ABC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1999);
United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. Elmore, 56
M.J. 533 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001).
165
Seven of the cases are from the courts of appeal and one is from the military
court of appeal. See Crisp, 324 F.3d 261; Mooney, 315 F.3d 54; Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579;
Hernandez, 2002 WL 1335595; Johnson, 30 Fed. Appx. 686; Battle, 1999 WL 596966;
Paul, 175 F.3d 906; Elmore, 56 M.J. 533.
166
Hernandez, 2002 WL 1335595. The court of appeals seemed puzzled at the
restrictive approach, which was borrowed from United States v. Hines. See Hernandez,
2002 WL 133559, at *2.
167
Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1097; Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939.
168
Brewer, 2002 WL 596365.
169
Lewis, 2002 WL 31055185. The government in this case pushed the limits of
expert qualification too far even for a Daubert hearing.
170
Hidalgo, No. CR-01-1011-PHX-FJM (D. Ariz. Nov. 6, 2002); Rutherford, 104 F.
Supp. 2d 1190; Santillan, 1999 WL 1201765; Brown, No. CR 99-184 ABC (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 1, 1999); Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62.
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171

testimony globally.
172
At least four (and perhaps many more, since the opinions
often do not give sufficient detail to determine) of the nineteen
opinions admitting the proffered testimony (with or without
restrictions) involved the kind of subtask or boundary problems
described above. But in none of those cases was the subtask problems
identified, nor did they have an explicit effect on the outcome.
Indeed, somewhat ironically, one of the four exclusions in this set of
cases was a violation of Kumho Tire’s requirements, invoking the
precedent of two of the other exclusions without checking to see if
their grounds of exclusion applied to the case before the court (they
173
didn’t).
So the bulk of district courts, whatever else they may be
doing, are not performing very well under the requirements of
Kumho Tire, and as a result, testimony on many subtasks of
questionable reliability is being allowed in front of the jury.
This same pattern is not restricted to handwriting identification
cases. An examination of all the reported opinions in criminal cases
since the decision in Kumho Tire shows that there is only one area
which has gotten substantially more attention since that decision than
it did before, and that is fingerprint identification, that ne plus ultra of
claimed perfection in the forensic identification disciplines. What
comes of asking the wrong question can have no better illustration
than that which comes from a consideration of the fingerprint
challenges in general, and from the most famous of those cases, the
case of Carlos Ivan Lllera Plaza, in particular.
B. The Fingerprint Cases
Judge Pollak’s two conflicting opinions in United States v. Llera
174
Plaza are by now the stuff of legend. Much has been written on
them already. However, both of those opinions and what has been
written about them seem generally to have missed the point. Both
opinions are stark violations of the approach mandated by Kumho
Tire. One can read both opinions until the last trump is sounded,
171

Prime, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1203; Nadurath, 2002 WL 1000929; Gricco, 2002 WL
746037; Richmond, 2001 WL 1117235.
172
Battle, 1999 WL 596966; Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190; Brown, No. CR 99-184
ABC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1999); Elmore, 56 M.J. 533.
173
Brewer, 2002 WL 596365. It might shock some of our critics in the forensic
science community to realize it, but we consider exclusion in this manner as
erroneous as admission.
174
United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter
Llera Plaza I]; United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
[hereinafter Llera Plaza II].
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and never have an inkling about the “task at hand,” as defined by the
particular factual circumstances to which the claimed expertise was
applied in Llera Plaza’s actual case (the “target issue,” in our terms).
In order to understand why such formulation was critically important
in this case (aside from the fact that it seems to have been mandated
by the Supreme Court of the United States), we must give a quick
review of fingerprint theory and practice and the issues attendant to
it.
Putting aside the overblown nineteenth century language of
absolute uniqueness in which the claims of fingerprint identification
are usually expressed, the main claim may be reformulated in more
acceptable modern terminology, thus: Human skin contains a fairly
sizable extent of ridged skin on the palms and fingers of the hands
and the soles and toes of the feet. The usual theoretical account for
175
its function is that the ridges increase friction on the surfaces,
where increased friction for traction and gripping would be of
survival benefit. Such work as has been done on the subject indicates
that the pattern of ridges in any given individual is constant
176
throughout life.
Setting aside the question of whether no two
people share the “exact” same pattern of ridges and perceptible
detail associated with them, it is clear that not every person has the
same pattern of ridges as every other person across the entire extent
of their ridged skin. Indeed, though surprisingly little defensible
formal research has been done on the question, it seems apparent
enough from anecdotal information that variation is so common that
“exact matches” across the entire range of ridged skin are vanishingly
rare (if they occur at all in the human population now alive). There
is apparently some mechanism at work in the fetal development stage
which triggers the generation of the ridges by a process that exhibits
a fair amount of randomness at a fine level of organization and
177
detail (though the patterns fit general categories of pattern at a
175

Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d. at 495-96 (quoting the testimony of Dr. William
Babler, President of the American Dermatoglyphics Association, given in United States
v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Pa. 2002)); see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT
IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 108 (2001).
176
Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d. at 495-96 (reporting Babler’s testimony); David
A. Stoney, The Scientific Basis of Expert Testimony on Fingerprint Identification, in 3 DAVID
L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 27-2.2.1, at 383 (2d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter Stoney, Scientific Basis].
177
A start is being made at understanding how various processes, including
biological processes, can generate self-organizing patterns, displaying such a
combination of order and randomness by beginning with a set of relatively simple
conditions and subjecting them to fairly simple algorithms which instantiate both
positive and negative feedback. See Scott Camazine, Patterns in Nature, 112 NATURAL
HISTORY 34, 40 (2003). See generally SCOTT CAMAZINE, SELF-ORGANIZATION IN
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grosser level of examination).
However, because the ridges are
generally curvilinear in complex ways, describing the amount of
randomness and the likelihood of a random match is a daunting
179
theoretical problem. Even describing what constitutes a match is a
problem, because, contrary to popular belief, matches are often not
manifested in anything resembling perfect superimposability. The
curved and deformable nature of surfaces upon which prints of
ridged skin may be left, and the deformable nature of skin itself,
often defeats exact superimposition, so that even with prints
reflecting large extents of ridges, matching may be an exercise in
complex topographical judgment in accounting for such (usually
180
mild but perceptible) deformities preventing superimposition.
So, while the formal research necessary to justify such a
statement with formal data has not been done, and the empirical and
theoretical work which would give a proper explanatory account of
the mechanism behind the organization of ridged skin has not been
181
done, it seems uncontroversial in any serious way to say that the
amount of randomness in ridge organization is such that “no two
people” share the same pattern in a confusable way across the entire
extent of their ridged skin. We do not, however, use the entire
extent of ridged skin for identification purposes. Partly because of
convenience in “rolling” such prints and partly because it is the print
most likely to be left on a surface inadvertently, we use only the
ridged skin on the balls of the fingers. The standard practice known
to everyone who has ever been “fingerprinted” is to ink the balls of
the fingers and roll them onto a card in boxes marked out for each
digit. The result is a set of ten prints of known orientation
comprising about one square-inch each, for a total of roughly ten
182
square-inches of ridged skin.
Again, as in the case of the entire
extent of ridged skin, the formal research necessary to establish
random match probabilities for two sets of ten prints from different
people has not been done, but it seems fair to conclude that such
probability is sufficiently minuscule not to trouble the practical
certainty which we seek in the law. When an unidentified body is
BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS (2001).
178
See COLE, supra note 175, at 114.
179
Id. at 260; David A. Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in ADVANCES
IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY (Henry C. Lee & Robert E. Gaensslen eds., 2001); David
A. Stoney & John I. Thornton, A Critical Analysis of Quantitative Fingerprint
Individuality Models, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1187 (1986).
180
Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 27-2.2.5.
181
Or is just beginning. See supra note 177.
182
Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (discussing testimony of David Ashbaugh).
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found, and a ten print card is rolled from the fingers of the corpse,
and it is found to match one on file with a law enforcement agency,
doubts about the belief warrant for the identification would seem
trivial.
At the other extreme, however, it is clear that there is a lower
limit of certainty. If a glass found in a room where a murder had
been committed had a smudge on it which showed clearly only one
portion of one ridge one sixty-fourth of an inch long (a very “partial,”
“latent print”), neither its curvature nor any microscopic detail
connected with it would allow a confident identification. Since no
one knows its orientation, or which digit it came from, it would have
to be compared with every short length of every ridge on every print
of a candidate card, and no one knows exactly how many such short
lengths of a ridge might match it in any randomly selected ten-print
card.
So, in regard to the admissibility of fingerprint identification,
there would seem to be two potential issues of reliability, one trivial
and one extremely important. The first would challenge the
admissibility of any identification derived from fingerprint
comparison, on the ground that without formal research and
quantified statistical modeling, its reliability could not be established.
Such a challenge is puckish, quixotic, and in some ways constructive,
183
but in others not.
In the end, it is doomed to failure, and not
simply for the wrong reasons either. First, there has been a little
empirical study that tends to indicate that, at least in regard to large
clear areas of ridged skin, variability is large and coincidental matches
184
are at least very rare.
Second, the extensive use of ten-print
comparisons for identification of unknown persons followed by later
confirmation of identity from other sources and no known record of
error can be said to form a practical accuracy feedback loop unique
183

Such positions can be used to paint all critics of forensic science as radical
bomb-throwers and extremists deserving of small consideration. For a milder and
more nuanced, but still (in our view) much too global version of a similar argument,
see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Flawed Expert Testimony: Striking the Right Balance in
Admissibility Standards, 18 CRIM. JUST. 28 (2003), which asserts that critics demand
unreasonable global exclusion, and apparently argues for (to our minds)
unreasonably global admission.
184
The so-called “50k x 50k study” testified to by Donald Ziesig of Lockheed
Martin Information Systems, which computer-compared each of 50,000 individual
rolled loop class prints from white males with each other, was such a study. See Llera
Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 497. This study is referred to in S.B. Meagher, B. Budowle
& D. Ziesig, 50K vs. 50K Fingerprint Comparison Test (1999) (unpublished), in Stoney,
Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 27-2.1.2[6], at 381 n.12, and must be taken with
something of a grain of salt, since it was FBI-commissioned and appears never to
have been published.
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among forensic identification techniques.
While more defensible
research is to be encouraged, a global challenge to the reliability of
all fingerprint identification is a non-starter.
The second potential challenge is the important one. It is based
on the boundary problem described above: identification of a
practical threshold of reliability for “partial prints.” What standards
should be applied to ensure that identifications from a small area of
print found at a crime scene are sufficiently reliable for purposes of
the criminal law? Here, the absence of formal data ought to be more
troubling under Daubert and Kumho Tire. This is especially true
because fingerprint experts either disagree on how to characterize
the threshold of reliability, or more commonly, claim that such a
186
threshold cannot be described at all.
This is the result of the
addition to fingerprint examination over the last decades of new
sources of information (often now collectively referred to under the
187
title “ridgeology”)
which makes old thresholds fail in some
188
circumstances.
Extensive clear prints such as ten-print cards might be quickly
matchable by general pattern at the first general level of observation
189
(sometimes called “the first level of analysis”), and confirmed by
185

Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 27-2.3.2.
COLE, supra note 175, at 262-63; Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 272.3.1[2].
187
“Ridgeology” as a term appears traceable to a 1983 pamphlet by David
Ashbaugh, a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, entitled “Ridgeology.”
The specific detail to which he referred, such as the presence of pores and
characteristics of curvature, had been known and considered for some time (the use
of pores even has its own term, “poroscopy”), but Ashbaugh’s radical claim that
identification was always a gestalt which could never be subject to any threshold
system of points (which had been foreshadowed by a resolution of the International
Association of Identification, the leading organization of fingerprint examiners) was
embraced by many. See COLE, supra note 175, at 261-66.
188
Or rather, which makes old thresholds overly conservative in the eyes of some.
COLE, supra note 175, at 263.
189
Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (referring to “first level of detail”). This is
all part of what is now billed as the “ACE-V” methodology, a “methodology” so
lacking in methodological detail as to be, upon reflection, nearly hilarious. The A
stands for “assess,” that is, look at a latent print and decide whether it is too smudged
or small even to try to analyze it, and whether any apparent detail ought to be
ignored because it represents a “double tapped” or overlapping print. The C stands
for “comparison,” and that means, well, the examiner is to compare the known and
the latent print, though there are apparently no fixed standards for performing such
a comparison. Rather, it is based “on the training and experience of the examiner.”
The E stands for “evaluation,” which means that the examiner decides if the two are
similar enough to declare that they are a match, without reference to any particular
notion of minimum points of correspondence, and V stands for “validation,” which is
a non-blind checking of the first examiner’s work by a second examiner. This is the
“scientific technique” which the government in Llera Plaza argued “met all four of
186
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correspondence of individual landmarks (often called minutiae) at
the next level of magnification (often called the “second level of
191
192
analysis”).
These landmarks were the Galton solution to the
curvilinear nature of ridges, identifications of characteristics which
could serve as discrete units of analysis, such as the point where one
ridge divides into two (often called a “bifurcation”), or the division of
193
two ridges followed by their closure again (a “lake”), etc.
The
correspondence of such landmarks, the number of ridges separating
them, and the relative direction and distance of their separation, are
traditionally the stuff of determining the “number of points of
comparison” between two prints.
However, at yet higher
194
magnification (referred to sometimes as “third level analysis”), a
clear print will show yet more supplementary information detail,
including the width and shoreline of individual stretches of ridge,
and the presence of pores separated by variable distances. Herein
lies the rub. Traditional reliability thresholds typically required from
seven to sixteen landmark points of comparison, with no unexplained
195
differences.
Adding the third level of magnification means,
according to most examiners, that fewer traditional points are
necessary in a clear print because the new detail can make up for
196
fewer landmarks in individual cases.
Why the new details of
ridgeology cannot simply be assimilated into the “points of
comparison” available to make up a conservative quantified
197
minimum is not completely clear.
Given the subjective nature of
the Daubert guidelines.” Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 560. Judge Pollak found
ACE-V not to be “scientific,” but appears to have taken it seriously as a
“methodology.” Id. at 561-69.
190
Traditionally (per Sir Francis Galton) the term “minutiae” (singular,
“minutia”) was synonymous with “Galton points.” See Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra
note 176, § 27-2.1.2[5]; see also COLE, supra note 175, at 79-80. There may be a trend
toward applying the term to the even smaller “third level” detail. See Llera Plaza I, 179
F. Supp. 2d at 500 (attributing similar terminology to FBI Fingerprint Unit Chief
Stephen Meagher).
191
Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (referring to “level two detail”).
192
British biostatistician, geneticist, eugenicist and fingerprint pioneer Sir Francis
Galton (1822-1911). See COLE, supra note 175, at 79-80.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Stoney, Scientific Basis, supra note 176, § 27-2.1.2[5].
196
Id.
197
The argument seems to have two aspects. First, some landmarks, such as a
“trifurcation,” are so rare that their presence even without much else might be
enough for confident identification. Second, the process is claimed to be a
subjective gestalt process which is not rationally subject to universal thresholds made
up of specified criteria. See id. While the latter may actually describe what examiners
do, it would seem desirable to hold them to some sort of statable minimum even at
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the evaluation at the boundary, the necessity, for the purposes of the
law, of a mandated threshold in some form would seem most
consistent with the policies of Daubert, Kumho, Rule 702, and the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the criminal law.
This is especially true because such evaluations at the boundary are
usually performed without any masking protocols to prevent
suggestion or expectation from affecting the results, and without any
198
line-up type foils which, in this area, could be easily supplied.
However, again consistent with Kumho Tire, such determinations of
the appropriate reliability threshold should be dealt with in cases
which arguably present specific examples of the boundary problem.
And here is where Judge Pollak crashed. As we said previously,
nowhere in either opinion does he tell us anything about the nature
and extent of the latent fingerprints under examination in Llera
Plaza’s case. In the first opinion (Llera Plaza I) he prepares a hash
comprised of ruminations on global reliability, the threshold
problem and the lack of formal research, concluding that because of
the lack of formal data, fingerprint identification globally can never
support testimony by an examiner concerning actual identification,
199
presumably even in a ten-print comparison. Rather than excluding
them from the courtroom completely, however, he applies the
universal solvent du jour and declares that they may function as
“Hines” witnesses, pointing out similarities but rendering no
200
conclusion.
How a jury would be qualified by experience to
evaluate such testimony as to fingerprint correspondences was left
unclear.
201
Judge Pollak reversed himself two
For whatever reasons,
the cost of giving up the occasional accurate identification in court. (Such
information could of course still be used as an investigative lead.)
198
See Risinger et al., Observer Effects, supra note 18, at 43.
199
This was based on a determination that the “AC” part of the “ACE-V”
“methodology” was objective, but the “E” (for evaluation) part was too subjective to
(ever) be reliable. Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
200
So called based on the similar decision of Judge Gertner in regard to
handwriting identification testimony in United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.
Mass 1999), upon which Judge Pollak explicitly relied. Llera Plaza I, 179 F. Supp. 2d
at 517.
201
One could fill a book with speculations about what led to the volte face. The
government got its toe-hold on a reconsideration by producing the results of FBI
fingerprint examiner proficiency tests, tests which they had theretofore kept secret,
presumably because the results (in contrast to their usual claims) were not perfect.
On the government’s tendency to keep empirical results secret if they do not like
them, see D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and Leviathan:
Law Enforcement Sponsored Research and the Criminal Process,___ MICH. ST. DCL L. REV.
___ (forthcoming 2003). There was also reason to believe that the proficiency tests
were so easy as to have little to do with the boundary problem. At any rate, although
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months later in Llera-Plaza II. In that opinion, he says that he had
gone too far in declaring that fingerprint identification witnesses
should be treated merely as “Hines” witnesses, and so he reverses
himself, declaring that in general fingerprint identification witnesses
should be allowed to testify as they always have, while he encourages
research to continue to provide a theoretical basis for such testimony.
However, once again, he never describes the factual contours of the
“task at hand” in the case, and never addresses in any organized way
the boundary issue regarding a reliability threshold for fingerprint
identification. Toward the end of the process this apparently begins
to dawn, for the last line of Llera Plaza II is: “At the upcoming trial,
the presentation of expert fingerprint testimony by the government .
. . will be subject to the court’s oversight prior to presentation of such
testimony before the jury, with a view to insuring that . . . fingerprints
offered in evidence will be of a quality arguably susceptible of
202
responsible analysis, comparison and evaluation.” Why that was not
the focus of the entire Daubert/Kumho Tire inquiry from the
beginning, we will probably never know.
If Llera Plaza II answered the trivial question and avoided the
hard one by violating the strictures laid down by the Supreme Court
in Kumho Tire, it has certainly been treated as disposing of all
questions by subsequent courts facing fingerprint identification
reliability challenges.
This dénouement was unfortunately
predictable, given how much courts want to avoid such issues and
seek even inapplicable precedents to use in this way. The Llera Plaza
debacle will probably delay appropriate judicial examination of the
boundary problem of threshold reliability in regard to fingerprint
identification applied to partial latent prints for a long time to come.
Such are sometimes the costs of the judge’s failure to frame the
question before the court with proper specificity.
To give Judge Pollak his due, he at least attempted to take on a
hard issue, and it is only fair to note that Judge Pollak is hardly alone
in failing to frame the fingerprint reliability issue in the case before
him with the specificity required by Kumho Tire. Since the year 2000
there have been a spate of challenges to the reliability of fingerprint
identification raised in the federal courts, generating twenty-one
203
opinions, and in not a single case has the court described the
Judge Pollak was critical of them, they were good enough in the end to be a part of
the basis for Judge Pollak’s self-reversal. Id. at 565-66.
202
Llera Plaza II, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
203
United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. NavarroFletes, 49 Fed. Appx. 732 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hernandez, 299 F.3d 984
(8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Ambriz-Vasquez, 34 Fed. Appx. 356 (9th Cir. 2002);
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individual characteristics of the latent prints which were the subject
of the challenge. It is enough to make one feel sorry for the
Supreme Court, so little has Kumho Tire been read with care by
judges.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to prosecution-proffered expertise, the approach
taken by courts in handwriting and fingerprint reliability tasks is not
atypical. A perusal of all the reported opinions in criminal cases
since the decision in Kumho Tire reveals a predominance of
inappropriately global examination, especially in regard to
experience-based claims of expertise. The Supreme Court has only
itself to blame for this state of affairs. First, while it is clear in context
that references to “discretion” and “flexibility” were meant only to
allow the intelligent selection of the most rationally appropriate
criteria of reliability for a particular kind of expertise and its claims in
relation to the particular facts of the case, they have been seized upon
by the lower courts as a warrant to avoid hard tasks of framing and
204
evaluation, at least in regard to prosecution proffers.
No matter
United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. MartinezGarduno, 31 Fed. Appx. 475 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Williams, 29 Fed. Appx.
486 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Rogers, 26 Fed. Appx. 171 (4th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Merritt,
Cause No. IP01-0081-CR-01-T/F, 2002 WL 1821821 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2002); United
States v. Nadurath, No. 4:02-CR-32-A, 2002 WL 1000929 (N.D. Tex. May 14, 2002);
United States v. Mitchell, 199 F. Supp. 2d 262 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United States v. CruzRivera, Crim. No. 00-98-01 (CCC), 2002 WL 662128 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2002); United
States v. Salim, 189 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D. Kan. 2002); United States v. Cline, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2002); United States v. Reaux, Crim. Action No. 01-071
Section “R” (2), 2001 WL 883221 (E.D. La. July 31, 2001); United States v. Joseph,
Crim. Action No. 99-238 Section “N,” 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001);
United States v. Martinez-Cintron, 136 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.P.R. 2001); United States v.
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000); Unites States v. Cooper, 91 F. Supp.
2d 79 (D.D.C. 2000). These opinions are in addition to the two Llera Plaza decisions.
204
There is also reason to believe the that district courts have held criminal
defendants’ proffers to a higher standard of threshold reliability than prosecution
proffers. See generally, Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability, supra note 3. It is in some
ways easy to account for this. Absent unusual circumstances resulting in an
interlocutory appeal, exclusion of prosecution proffers by the trial court is
unreviewable, whereas exclusion of defense proffers, in the mind of the trial judge,
can be corrected on appeal if erroneous. It is easy to see how this can incline the
trial judge toward admission. See R. Erik Lilquist, A Comment on the Admissibility of
Forensic Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1189, 1191-92 (2003). However, the
Supreme Court’s decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997),
mandating review of Rule 702 rulings only by an “abuse of discretion” standard, has
resulted in virtual automatic affirmance by the courts of appeal, and created a
situation where nobody takes responsibility for seriously evaluating the actual
reliability of prosecution-proffered expertise.
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how clear this may appear to the scholarly observer, however, it is not
likely to change until the Supreme Court once again returns to this
area to inform the lower courts that it actually meant what it said.

